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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

“Plantinga's Case Against Naturalistic Epistemology”

Fales, Evan · 1996 · Philosophy of Science

Abstract

In Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga claims that metaphysical naturalism, when joined to a naturalized epistemology, is self-undermining. Plantinga argues that naturalists are committed to a neoDarwinian account of our origins, and that the reliability of our cognitive faculties is improbable or unknown relative to that theory. If the theory is true, then we are in no position to know that, whereas theism, if true, underwrites cognitive reliability. I seek to turn the tables on Plantinga, showing that neoDarwinism provides strong reasons for expecting general cognitive reliability, whereas the likelihood of that relative to theism is unknowable.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1086/289920

Cites

17 of 17 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Verification

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Citations

Cites

Show all 18 references

Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Plantinga, 1985, Alvin Plantinga
  2. Fales, Scientific Explanations of Mystical Experience, Parts I and II, Religious Studies
  3. Plantinga, 1991, When Faith and Reason Clash: Evolution and the Bible, Christian Scholars Review, 21, 8
  4. Fales, 1990, Causation and Universais
  5. Darwin, 1919, The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, I

Cited by

See all 33

Metadata

Authors
Fales, E.
Affiliations
University of Iowa (US)
Corresponding author
Fales, Evan
Venue
Philosophy of Science
Published
1996-09
Volume
63
Issue
3
Pages
432-451
ISSN
  • 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
  • 1539-767X
OpenAlex
W2031896745
Cited by
33
References
18
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 2
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
Keywords
Alvin Plantinga, naturalized epistemology, metaphysical naturalism, neo-Darwinism, cognitive reliability, theism, evolutionary theory of cognition, epistemic justification

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: “Plantinga's Case Against Naturalistic Epistemology”. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/289920
The paper
Fales, E. (1996). “Plantinga's Case Against Naturalistic Epistemology”. Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1086/289920

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.