The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
“Plantinga's Case Against Naturalistic Epistemology”
Abstract
In Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga claims that metaphysical naturalism, when joined to a naturalized epistemology, is self-undermining. Plantinga argues that naturalists are committed to a neoDarwinian account of our origins, and that the reliability of our cognitive faculties is improbable or unknown relative to that theory. If the theory is true, then we are in no position to know that, whereas theism, if true, underwrites cognitive reliability. I seek to turn the tables on Plantinga, showing that neoDarwinism provides strong reasons for expecting general cognitive reliability, whereas the likelihood of that relative to theism is unknowable.
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“Our heavy investment in big brains and otherwise mediocre bodies makes it all the more unlikely that resources would be wasted on elaborate belief-forming and processing mechanisms that have no practical utility (Fales, 1996, 440).”
From Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification (2011) · cites this paper as Fales, 1996
In the citing paper
“the probability that such elaborate neural structures as are needed for these cognitive capacities would have evolved without conferring any adaptive value is prima facie quite low, given their high biological costs”
From Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification (2011) · cites this paper as Fales, 1996
In the citing paper
“Homo sapiens has, more than any other species, specialized in intelligence as a survival strategy.”
From Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification (2011) · cites this paper as Fales, 1996
Citations
Cites
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(1982) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477 · Cited by 8,240
Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.
Cherniak, C., Nisbett, R., & Ross, L. (1983) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184495 · Cited by 4,196
Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.
Weiner, H. J., Nisbett, R., & Ross, L. (1981) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2287875 · Cited by 1,468
Flanagan, O. (1992) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2112.001.0001 · Cited by 713
Is human information processing conscious?
Velmans, M. (1991) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00071776 · Cited by 679
The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin: Including an Autobiographical Chapter
Darwin, C. (2009) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511702884 · Cited by 667
Stich, S. (1990) · Cited by 516
(1995) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5350.001.0001 · Cited by 320
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Plantinga, 1985, Alvin Plantinga
- Fales, Scientific Explanations of Mystical Experience, Parts I and II, Religious Studies
- Plantinga, 1991, When Faith and Reason Clash: Evolution and the Bible, Christian Scholars Review, 21, 8
- Fales, 1990, Causation and Universais
- Darwin, 1919, The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, I
Cited by
A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism
Melnyk, A. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498817 · Cited by 320
Biological function and epistemic normativity
Sullivan‐Bissett, E. (2017) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2017.1287296 · Cited by 70
“There are several reasons to think that this is the case, though space constraints prevent outlining them here (interested readers should see Millikan 1993c, 49, and discussion in Fales 1996).”
BackgroundEvolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification
De Cruz, H. (2011) · dialectica · doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01283.x · Cited by 32
Reformed and evolutionary epistemology and the noetic effects of sin
Cruz, H. D., & Smedt, J. D. (2012) · International Journal for Philosophy of Religion · doi:10.1007/s11153-012-9368-z · Cited by 42
“By contrast, according to evolutionary epistemologists (e.g., Fales 1996), human cognition is the product of a purely naturalistic evolutionary process that has honed cognition in such a way that it produces truth-approximating beliefs.”
BackgroundNatural Selection Does Care about Truth
Boudry, M., & Vlerick, M. (2014) · International Studies in the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1080/02698595.2014.915651 · Cited by 26
“As Fales (1996) has argued, the cognitive machinery for belief formation is energy-consuming for the organism, and is unlikely to have evolved without making a difference in behaviour.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Fales, E.
- Affiliations
- University of Iowa (US)
- Corresponding author
- Fales, Evan
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1996-09
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 432-451
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2031896745
- Cited by
- 33
- References
- 18
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- Alvin Plantinga, naturalized epistemology, metaphysical naturalism, neo-Darwinism, cognitive reliability, theism, evolutionary theory of cognition, epistemic justification
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: “Plantinga's Case Against Naturalistic Epistemology”. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/289920
- The paper
- Fales, E. (1996). “Plantinga's Case Against Naturalistic Epistemology”. Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1086/289920
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.