The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do Workers Prefer Increasing Wage Profiles?
Abstract
We present survey data challenging the assumption implicit in analyses of labor supply that, all else being equal, workers prefer declining over increasing wage profiles. We test several explanations for our results, including that (a) there is something special about wages (e.g., their association with productivity), as opposed to other types of payments, that induces the preference for increasing wages; (b) utility depends not only on absolute levels of consumption but also on changes in consumption over time; and (c) respondents who prefer increasing wage profiles are irrational and would change their behavior if the rationale for preferring declining wages were explained.
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Cited by
Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review
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Metadata
- Authors
- Loewenstein, G., & Sicherman, N.
- Venue
- Journal of Labor Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1991-01
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 67-84
- ISSN
- 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5307
- OpenAlex
- W2009939649
- Cited by
- 400
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 11.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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