Cited by 1,122Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsConflict Management and Negotiation

Social utility and decision making in interpersonal contexts.

Loewenstein, George F., Thompson, Leigh, Bazerman, Max H.·1989·Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Abstract

Three studies examined preferences for outcomes to self and a codisputant. Studies I and 2 estimated social utility functions from judgments of with alternative outcomes. Comparing functional forms, we found that a utility function, including terms for own payoff and for positive and negative discrepancies between the parties' payoffs (advantageous and disadvantageous inequality), provides a close fit to the data. The typical utility function is steeply increasing and convex for disadvantageous inequality and weakly declining and convex for advantageous inequality. We manipulated dispute type (personal, business) and disputant relationship (positive, neutral, or negative) and found that both strongly influence preferences for advantageous but not disadvantageous inequality. A third study contrasted implications of the social utility functions with predictions of individual utility theories. People care about the outcomes of others. We sacrifice our own interests to help loved ones or harm adversaries. Participants withdraw from profitable participation in a laboratory experiment if they perceive inequity in remuneration (Schmitt & Marweli, 1972). Players in two-person ultimatum games (in which one player proposes a distribution of a fixed amount of money that the other has the option of either accepting or rejecting) frequently reject a positive but inequitable offer even though the alternative is no gain at all (Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). Negotiations between pa…

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Crossref · 10.1037/0022-3514.57.3.426

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  • Negotiators are strongly averse to settling even slightly below the point they view as fair.

    “Third, negotiators are strongly averse to settling even slightly below the point they view as fair (Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman, 1989).”

    From Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases (1997) · cites this paper as Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman, 1989

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Authors
Loewenstein, G. F., Thompson, L., & Bazerman, M. H.
Affiliations
  • University of Chicago (US)
  • University of Washington (US)
  • Northwestern University (US)
Venue
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Published
1989-09
Volume
57
Issue
3
Pages
426-441
ISSN
  • 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1315
OpenAlex
W2109954531
Cited by
1,122
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 23 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 28 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 40 · 2020: 39 · 2019: 49 · 2018: 44 · 2017: 38 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 60 · 2014: 46 · 2013: 51 · 2012: 60
FWCI
24.85
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Conflict Management and Negotiation
Keywords
social utility, interpersonal decision making, social preferences, inequality aversion, ultimatum game, interpersonal conflict, negotiation

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