The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply
Abstract
A critical input for assessing the optimal size of disability insurance programs is the elasticity of labor force participation with respect to the generosity of benefits. Unfortunately, this parameter has been difficult to estimate in the context of the U.S. disability insurance program since all workers face an identical benefits schedule. I surmount this problem by studying the experience of Canada, which operates two distinct disability insurance programs: for Quebec and for the rest of Canada. The latter program raised its benefits by 36 percent in January 1987, whereas benefits in Quebec were constant. I find a sizable labor supply response to the policy change; my central estimates imply an elasticity of labor force nonparticipation with respect to disability insurance benefits of 0.28–0.36.
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Citations
Cites
The Decline in Male Labor Force Participation
Parsons, D. O. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260850 · Cited by 416
Do Minimum Wages Reduce Employment? A Case Study of California, 1987–89
Card, D. (1992) · ILR Review · doi:10.1177/001979399204600104 · Cited by 390
Bound, J., & Waidmann, T. (1992) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118393 · Cited by 168
The Decline in Male Labor Force Participation: Comment
HAVEMAN, R. H., & Wolfe, B. L. (1984) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261241 · Cited by 113
Self-Screening in Targeted Public Transfer Programs
Parsons, D. O. (1991) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261781 · Cited by 110
Cited by
Angrist, J. D., & Krueger, A. B. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.4.69 · Cited by 2,355
The Rise in the Disability Rolls and the Decline in Unemployment
Autor, D. H., & Duggan, M. G. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535171 · Cited by 947
Does happiness adapt? A longitudinal study of disability with implications for economists and judges
Oswald, A. J., & Powdthavee, N. (2008) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.01.002 · Cited by 564
Maestas, N., Mullen, K. J., & Strand, A. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.5.1797 · Cited by 489
Angrist, J. D., & Krueger, A. B. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.281433 · Cited by 463
Black, D., Daniel, K., & Sanders, S. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802760015595 · Cited by 371
Dahl, G. B., Kostøl, A. R., & Mogstad, M. (2014) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qju019 · Cited by 323
The work disincentive effects of the disability insurance program in the 1990s
Chen, S., & van der Klaauw, W. (2008) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.016 · Cited by 290
Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis
Kamar, E., Karaca-Mandic, P., & Talley, E. (2007) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewn019 · Cited by 117
Dynamics of health and labor market risks
Haan, P., & Myck, M. (2009) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2009.09.001 · Cited by 96
Metadata
- Authors
- Gruber, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2000-12
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1162-1183
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2891077897
- Cited by
- 317
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 32.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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