The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor Supply
Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of the marriage market and divorce legislation on household labor supply. In our approach, the sex ratio in the marriage market and the rules governing divorce are examples of “distribution factors.” These factors are defined as variables that affect the household members’ bargaining position but not preferences or the joint budget set. We extend the collective labor supply model developed by Chiappori to allow for distribution factors. We show that our model imposes new restrictions on the labor supply functions and eases the identification of individual preferences and the intrahousehold decision process. The model is estimated using PSID data for the year 1988. Our results do not reject the restrictions imposed by the model. Also, the sex ratio and divorce laws deemed favorable to women are found to affect labor supply behavior and the decision process in the directions predicted by the theory and to have sizable effects.
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Cited by
Women Empowerment and Economic Development
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The Competitive Saving Motive: Evidence from Rising Sex Ratios and Savings Rates in China
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Estimating Consumption Economies of Scale, Adult Equivalence Scales, and Household Bargaining Power
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Metadata
- Authors
- Chiappori, P., Fortin, B., & Lacroix, G.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2002-02
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 37-72
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2111833104
- Cited by
- 901
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 63.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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