The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal
Abstract
The paper analyzes the effect of agricultural tenancy laws offering security of tenure to tenants and regulating the share of output that is paid as rent on farm productivity. Theoretically, the net impact of tenancy reform is shown to be a combination of two effects: a bargaining power effect and a security of tenure effect. Analysis of evidence on how contracts and productivity changed after a tenancy reform program was implemented in the Indian state of West Bengal in the late 1970s suggests that tenancy reform had a positive effect on agricultural productivity there.
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Citations
Cites
Property rights and investment incentives: theory and evidence from Ghana
Besley, T. (1995) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262008 · Cited by 2,016
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Shaban, R. A. (1987) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261495 · Cited by 426
Chapter 42 Power, distortions, revolt and reform in agricultural land relations
Binswanger, H. P., Deininger, K., & Feder, G. (1995) · Handbook of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4471(95)30019-8 · Cited by 294
Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints and Sharecropping in El Oulja
Laffont, J.-J., & Matoussi, M. S. (1995) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298034 · Cited by 267
The state and poverty in India : the politics of reform
Kohli, A. (1987) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · Cited by 188
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Land Reform, Income Redistribution, and Agricultural Production in Korea
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Self-citationInformational Rents and Property Rights in Land
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Cited by
The Economic Lives of the Poor
Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.1.141 · Cited by 1,703
Self-citation‘Do rural banks matter? Evidence from the Indian social banking experiment’
Burgess, R., & Pande, R. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201242 · Cited by 1,480
History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India
Banerjee, A., & Iyer, L. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054825574 · Cited by 1,268
Self-citationThe profits of power: land rights and agricultural investment in Ghana
Goldstein, M., & Udry, C. (2008) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/595561 · Cited by 1,142
Property rights for the poor: Effects of land titling
Galiani, S., & Schargrodsky, E. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.06.002 · Cited by 684
Metadata
- Authors
- Banerjee, A. V., Gertler, P. J., & Ghatak, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2002-04
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 239-280
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2096264528
- Cited by
- 552
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 44.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.