The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form
Open accessAbstract
Empirical work on contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics. If (i) some of these characteristics are unobserved or partially observed and (ii) there are incentives whereby particular types of agents end up contracting with particular types of principals, estimated coefficients on the observed characteristics may be misleading. We address this endogenous matching problem using a data set on agricultural contracts between landlords and tenants in early Renaissance Tuscany. Controlling for endogenous matching has an impact on parameters of interest, and tenants’ risk aversion appears to have influenced contract choice.
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Cites
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
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Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913238 · Cited by 2,859
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1983) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912246 · Cited by 2,095
Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping
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Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results
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Assortative Matching and Search
Shimer, R., & Smith, L. (2000) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00112 · Cited by 761
A theory of contractual structure in agriculture
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Cited by
Managerial Attributes and Executive Compensation
Graham, J. R., Li, S., & Qiu, J. (2012) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr076 · Cited by 549
Blair, R. D., & Lafontaine, F. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511753879 · Cited by 364
International Franchising Practices in Mexico: Do Franchisors Customize Their Contracts?
Lafontaine, F., & Oxley, J. E. (2004) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00005.x · Cited by 69
Land Tenure, Investment Incentives, and the Choice of Techniques: Evidence from Nicaragua
Bandiera, O. (2007) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/lhm005 · Cited by 66
Metadata
- Authors
- Ackerberg, D. A., & Botticini, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2002-06
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 564-591
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W3124399299
- Cited by
- 482
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 64.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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