The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Altruistic and Joy‐of‐Giving Motivations in Charitable Behavior
Open accessAbstract
This study theoretically and empirically examines altruistic and joy‐of‐giving motivations underlying contributions to charitable activities. The theoretical analysis shows that in an economy with an infinitely large number of donors, impurely altruistic preferences lead to either asymptotically zero or complete crowd‐out. The paper then establishes conditions on preferences that are sufficient to yield zero crowd‐out in the limit. These conditions are fairly weak and quite plausible. An empirical representation of the model is estimated using a new 1986–92 panel of donations and government funding from the United States to 125 international relief and development organizations. Besides directly linking sources of public and private support, the econometric analysis controls for unobserved institution‐specific factors, institution‐specific changes in leadership, year‐to‐year changes in need, and expenditures by related organizations. The estimates show little evidence of crowd‐out from either direct public or related private sources. Thus, at the margin, donations to these organizations appear to be motivated solely by joy‐of‐giving preferences. In addition to addressing the basic question of motives behind charitable giving, the results help explain the existing disparity between econometric and experimental crowd‐out estimates.
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Cites
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Cited by
Bekkers, R., & Wiepking, P. (2011) · Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly · doi:10.1177/0899764010380927 · Cited by 1,503
Shang, J., & Croson, R. (2009) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02267.x · Cited by 764
Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment
Karlan, D., & List, J. A. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.5.1774 · Cited by 519
Group Size and Incentives to Contribute: A Natural Experiment at Chinese Wikipedia
Zhang, X. (., & Zhu, F. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.4.1601 · Cited by 499
Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations
Steinberg, R. (2003) · Nonprofit and Civil Society Studies · doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-0131-2_16 · Cited by 462
Green Markets and Private Provision of Public Goods
Kotchen, M. J. (2006) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/506337 · Cited by 433
The Market for Charitable Giving
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Is crowding out due entirely to fundraising? Evidence from a panel of charities
Andreoni, J., & Payne, A. A. (2011) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.011 · Cited by 323
An experimental test of warm glow giving
Crumpler, H., & Grossman, P. J. (2008) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.014 · Cited by 318
Relative Earnings and Giving in a Real-Effort Experiment
Erkal, N., Gangadharan, L., & Nikiforakis, N. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.7.3330 · Cited by 263
Scientists@Home: What Drives the Quantity and Quality of Online Citizen Science Participation?
Nov, O., Arazy, O., & Anderson, D. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090375 · Cited by 254
The Causes and Consequences of Internal Control Problems in Nonprofit Organizations
Petrovits, C., Shakespeare, C., & Shih, A. (2011) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.00000012 · Cited by 254
Metadata
- Authors
- Ribar, D. C., & Wilhelm, M. O.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2002-04
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 425-457
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2123866001
- Cited by
- 415
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 31.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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