The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do Subsidies Increase Charitable Giving in the Long Run? Matching Donations in a Field Experiment
Open accessAbstract
Subsidizing charitable giving—for example, for victims of natural disasters—is very popular, not only with governments but also with private organizations. Many companies match their employees' charitable contributions, hoping that this will foster the willingness to contribute. However, systematic analyses of the effect of such a matching mechanism are still lacking. This article tests the effect of matching charitable giving in a randomized field experiment in the short and the long run. The donations of a randomly selected group were matched by contributions from an anonymous donor. The results support the hypothesis that a matching mechanism increases contributions to a public good. However, in the periods after the experiment, when matching donations have been stopped, the contribution rate declines for the treatment group. The matching mechanism leads to a negative net effect on the participation rate. The field experiment therefore provides evidence suggesting that the willingness to contribute may be undermined by a matching mechanism in the long run.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.627 · Cited by 7,176
Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving
Andreoni, J. (1990) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234133 · Cited by 5,825
Psychological Contracts in Organizations: Understanding Written and Unwritten Agreements
Rousseau, D. (1995) · doi:10.4135/9781452231594 · Cited by 3,453
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1652 · Cited by 3,357
Thaler, R. H. (1999) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/(sici)1099-0771(199909)12:3<183::aid-bdm318>3.0.co;2-f · Cited by 3,166
Frey, B. S., & Jegen, R. (2001) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00150 · Cited by 3,011
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00253 · Cited by 2,913
Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All*
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554917 · Cited by 2,175
Harrison, G. W., & List, J. A. (2004) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051043004577 · Cited by 2,099
Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
Andreoni, J., & Miller, J. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00302 · Cited by 1,936
Cited by
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1652 · Cited by 3,357
When and Why Incentives (Don't) Work to Modify Behavior
Gneezy, U., Meier, S., & Rey-Biel, P. (2011) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.25.4.191 · Cited by 1,735
Self-citationBekkers, R., & Wiepking, P. (2011) · Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly · doi:10.1177/0899764010380927 · Cited by 1,503
Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing “Conditional Cooperation” in a Field Experiment
Frey, B. S., & Meier, S. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828043052187 · Cited by 1,184
Self-citationFalk, A., & Kosfeld, M. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1611 · Cited by 1,040
Metadata
- Authors
- Meier, S.
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2007-12-01
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1203-1222
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- 1542-4774
- OpenAlex
- W3123111016
- Cited by
- 326
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 20.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Do Subsidies Increase Charitable Giving in the Long Run? Matching Donations in a Field Experiment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/jeea.2007.5.6.1203
- The paper
- Meier, S. (2007). Do Subsidies Increase Charitable Giving in the Long Run? Matching Donations in a Field Experiment. Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2007.5.6.1203
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.