The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Managerial Attributes and Executive Compensation
Abstract
We study the role of firm- and manager-specific heterogeneities in executive compensation. We decompose the variation in executive compensation and find that time-invariant firm and, especially, manager fixed effects explain a majority of the variation in executive pay. We then show that in many settings, it is important to include fixed effects to mitigate potential omitted variable bias. Furthermore, we find that compensation fixed effects are significantly correlated with management styles (i.e., manager fixed effects in corporate policies). Finally, the method used in the article has a number of potential applications in financial economics. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.
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Cites
Hsiao, C. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139839327 · Cited by 7,869
Hsiao, C. (2022) · doi:10.1017/9781009057745 · Cited by 7,869
Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education
Becker, G. S. (1993) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226041223.001.0001 · Cited by 4,509
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00058-0 · Cited by 4,335
Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies
Bertrand, M., & Schoar, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355303322552775 · Cited by 3,894
High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms
Abowd, J. M., Kramarz, F., & Margolis, D. N. (1999) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00020 · Cited by 2,601
The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1991) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3665716 · Cited by 2,309
Payout policy in the 21st century
Brav, A., Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Michaely, R. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.07.004 · Cited by 2,239
Self-citationBack to the Beginning: Persistence and the Cross‐Section of Corporate Capital Structure
LEMMON, M. L., ROBERTS, M. R., & ZENDER, J. F. (2008) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01369.x · Cited by 1,844
Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?*
Gabaix, X., & Landier, A. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.49 · Cited by 1,764
Cited by
Generalists versus specialists: Lifetime work experience and chief executive officer pay
Custódio, C., Ferreira, M. A., & Matos, P. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.01.001 · Cited by 745
Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958 · Cited by 542
Overconfidence, Compensation Contracts, and Capital Budgeting
GERVAIS, S., HEATON, J. B., & ODEAN, T. (2011) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01686.x · Cited by 538
Managers with and without Style: Evidence Using Exogenous Variation
Fee, C. E., Hadlock, C. J., & Pierce, J. R. (2013) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhs131 · Cited by 422
Metadata
- Authors
- Graham, J. R., Li, S., & Qiu, J.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-08-30
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 144-186
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2889841333
- Cited by
- 549
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 109.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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