The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Evaluating the Effect of Teachers’ Group Performance Incentives on Pupil Achievement
Abstract
Proposals to use teachers’ performance incentives have recently attracted considerable attention. However, there is very little experience with applying incentives in schools. This paper provides evidence on the causal effects of two programs: the first provided the school and its teachers with monetary performance incentives and the second with additional conventional resources. The assignment of schools to the two programs was not random; therefore, identification is a central issue in the empirical analysis. The empirical results suggest that schools’ and teachers’ group monetary incentives caused significant gains in many dimensions of students’ outcomes. Endowing schools with more resources also led to improvement in student performance. However, the comparison based on cost equivalency suggests that the teachers’ incentive intervention is much more cost effective.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator: Evidence from evaluating a job training programme
Heckman, J. J., Ichimura, H., & Todd, P. E. (1997) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2971733 · Cited by 5,486
Economics, Organization and Management.
Bhattacharya, S., Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2328903 · Cited by 4,644
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, E. P., & Rosen, S. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261010 · Cited by 4,560
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, E., & Rosen, S. (1979) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w0401 · Cited by 3,033
Performance Pay and Productivity
Lazear, E. P. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.5.1346 · Cited by 2,487
Campbell, D. T. (1969) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/h0027982 · Cited by 1,885
Peer Pressure and Partnerships
Kandel, E., & Lazear, E. P. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261840 · Cited by 1,756
The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market
Card, D. (1990) · ILR Review · doi:10.1177/001979399004300205 · Cited by 1,704
Random group effects and the precision of regression estimates
Moulton, B. R. (1986) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/0304-4076(86)90021-7 · Cited by 1,626
Cited by
Regression discontinuity designs in economics
Lee, D. S., & Lemieux, T. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.2.281 · Cited by 4,534
The Promise and Pitfalls of Using Imprecise School Accountability Measures
Kane, T. J., & Staiger, D. O. (2002) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533002320950993 · Cited by 503
(2014) · Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) · Cited by 464
Lavy, V. (2015) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12233 · Cited by 369
Self-citationTeacher Effects and Teacher-Related Policies
Jackson, C. K., Rockoff, J. E., & Staiger, D. O. (2014) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-040845 · Cited by 300
Metadata
- Authors
- Lavy, V.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2002-12
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1286-1317
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2108117797
- Cited by
- 448
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 54.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Evaluating the Effect of Teachers’ Group Performance Incentives on Pupil Achievement. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/342810
- The paper
- Lavy, V. (2002). Evaluating the Effect of Teachers’ Group Performance Incentives on Pupil Achievement. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/342810
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
