The DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate
Open accessAbstract
This paper empirically investigates the decisions of publicly traded firms where to incorporate. We study the features of states that make them attractive to incorporating firms and the characteristics of firms that determine whether they incorporate in or out of their state of location. We find that states that offer stronger antitakeover protections are substantially more successful both in retaining in-state firms and in attracting out-of-state incorporations. We estimate that, compared with adopting no antitakeover statutes, adopting all standard antitakeover statutes enabled the states that adopted them to more than double the percentage of local firms that incorporated in-state (from 23% to 49%). Indeed, we find no evidence that the incorporation market has even penalized the three states that passed antitakeover statutes widely viewed as detrimental to shareholders. We also find that there is commonly a big difference between a state's ability to attract incorporations from firms located in and out of the state, and we investigate several possible explanations for this home-state advantage. Our findings have significant implications for corporate governance, regulatory competition, and takeover law.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bebchuk, L. A., & Cohen, A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Law and Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2003-10
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 383-425
- ISSN
- 0022-2186 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5285
- OpenAlex
- W3124027873
- Cited by
- 289
- References
- 43
- FWCI
- 41.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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