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The Fugitive: Evidence on Public versus Private Law Enforcement from Bail Jumping

Helland, Eric, Tabarrok, Alexander · 2004 · The Journal of Law and Economics
Cited by 63

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

On the day of their trial, a substantial number of felony defendants fail to appear. Public police have the primary responsibility for pursuing and rearresting defendants who were released on their own recognizance or on cash or government bail. Defendants who made bail by borrowing from a bond dealer, however, must worry about an entirely different pursuer. When a defendant who has borrowed money skips trial, the bond dealer forfeits the bond unless the fugitive is soon returned. As a result, bond dealers have an incentive to monitor their charges and ensure that they do not skip. When a defendant does skip, bond dealers hire bounty hunters to return the defendants to custody. We compare the effectiveness of these two different systems by examining failure‐to‐appear rates, fugitive rates, and capture rates of felony defendants who fall under the various systems. We apply propensity score and matching techniques.

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Metadata

Authors
Helland, E., & Tabarrok, A.
Venue
The Journal of Law and Economics
Published
2004-04
Volume
47
Issue
1
Pages
93-122
ISSN
  • 0022-2186 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5285
OpenAlex
W2167699018
Cited by
63
References
4
FWCI
4.74
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Fugitive: Evidence on Public versus Private Law Enforcement from Bail Jumping. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/378694
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Helland, E., & Tabarrok, A. (2004). The Fugitive: Evidence on Public versus Private Law Enforcement from Bail Jumping. The Journal of Law and Economics. https://doi.org/10.1086/378694

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