Cited by 43Law, Economics, and Judicial SystemsCriminal Justice and Corrections AnalysisCriminal Justice and Penology

Does Cash Bail Deter Misconduct?

Ouss, Aurélie, Stevenson, Megan·2023·American Economic Journal: Applied Economics

Abstract

Courts routinely use low cash bail as a financial incentive to ensure released defendants appear in court and abstain from crime. This can create burdens for defendants with little empirical evidence on its efficacy. We exploit a prosecutor-driven reform that led to a sharp reduction in low cash bail and pretrial supervision, with no effect on pretrial detention, to test whether such incentive mechanisms succeed at their intended purpose. We find no evidence that financial collateral has a deterrent effect on failure to appear or pretrial crime. This paper also contributes to the literature on legal actor discretion, showing that nonbinding reforms may have limited impact on jail populations. (JEL K41, K42)

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Crossref · 10.1257/app.20210349

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Authors
Ouss, A., & Stevenson, M.
Affiliations
  • University of Pennsylvania (US)
  • University of Virginia (US)
Venue
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
Published
2023-07-01
Volume
15
Issue
3
Pages
150-182
ISSN
  • 1945-7782 (ISSN-L)
  • 1945-7790
OpenAlex
W4382585051
Cited by
28
References
30
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 2
FWCI
5.29
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • American Economic Journal Applied Economics (publishedVersion)
  • Penn Carey Law Legal Scholarship Repository (University of Pennsylvania) (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Criminal Justice and Corrections Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Law › Criminal Justice and Penology
Keywords
cash bail, pretrial detention, failure to appear, financial incentives, bail reform, jail population

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