The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Demand for Environmental Goods: Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives
Open accessAbstract
This article studies voting behavior on 16 environmental ballot propositions in California in order to characterize the demand for environmental goods. The environment is found to be a normal good for people with mean incomes, but some environmental goods are inferior for those with high incomes, at least when supplied collectively. An important “price” of environmental goods is reduced income in the construction, farming, forestry, and manufacturing industries. Income and price can explain most of the variation in voting; there is little need to introduce “preference” variables such as political ideology.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics
Maddala, G. S. (1983) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511810176 · Cited by 13,240
Economic growth and the environment
Grossman, G. M., & Krueger, A. B. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118443 · Cited by 9,901
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-8 · Cited by 5,483
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
Peltzman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466865 · Cited by 4,729
Using surveys to value public goods: the contingent valuation method
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.27-0417 · Cited by 4,215
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
Becker, G. S. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1886017 · Cited by 4,117
Environmental quality and development: Is there a Kuznets Curve for air pollution emissions?
Selden, T. M., & Song, D. (1994) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1006/jeem.1994.1031 · Cited by 2,850
De gustibus non est disputandum
Stigler, G. J., & Becker, G. S. (2010) · Idées économiques et sociales · doi:10.3917/idee.159.0054 · Cited by 2,282
Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?
Diamond, P. A., & Hausman, J. A. (1994) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.8.4.45 · Cited by 1,894
Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment
(1993) · Emerald Group Publishing Limited eBooks · doi:10.1108/s0573-8555(1993)220 · Cited by 1,113
New Estimates of Quality of Life in Urban Areas
Blomquist, G. C., Berger, M. C., & Hoehn, J. P. (1988) · American Economic Review · Cited by 802
Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics
Kalt, J. P., & Zupan, M. A. (1984) · American Economic Review · Cited by 712
Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting
Peltzman, S. (1984) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467062 · Cited by 541
Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years
Matsusaka, J. G. (1995) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261996 · Cited by 490
Self-citationDirector's Law of Public Income Redistribution
Stigler, G. J. (1970) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466680 · Cited by 383
Explaining voter turnout patterns: An information theory
Matsusaka, J. G. (1995) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf01047803 · Cited by 273
Self-citationIdeology, voting, and shirking
Kau, J. B., & Rubin, P. H. (1993) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf01049347 · Cited by 106
The rational voter: an analysis of two Atlanta referenda on rapid transit
Schroeder, L., & Sjoquist, D. L. (1978) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00154682 · Cited by 103
A critical review and an extension of the political shirking literature
Lott, J. R., & Davis, M. L. (1992) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00137690 · Cited by 90
VOTING ON GROWTH CONTROL MEASURES: PREFERENCES AND STRATEGIES*
Dubin, J. A., Kiewiet, D. R., & NOUSSAIR, C. N. (1992) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1992.tb00062.x · Cited by 66
Legislative Voting and the Economic Theory of Politics
Coates, D., & Munger, M. C. (1995) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061003 · Cited by 44
(1988) · Cited by 42
Cited by
What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions
Kroszner, R. S., & Strahan, P. E. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556223 · Cited by 862
Do greens drive Hummers or hybrids? Environmental ideology as a determinant of consumer choice
Kahn, M. E. (2007) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2007.05.001 · Cited by 510
Self-citationThe value of urban open space: Meta-analyses of contingent valuation and hedonic pricing results
Brander, L. M., & Koetse, M. J. (2011) · Journal of Environmental Management · doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2011.06.019 · Cited by 404
Matsusaka, J. G. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330054048713 · Cited by 389
Self-citationUnderstanding China's Urban Pollution Dynamics
Zheng, S., & Kahn, M. E. (2013) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.51.3.731 · Cited by 375
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Kahn, M. E., & Matsusaka, J. G.
- Venue
- The Journal of Law and Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1997-04
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 137-174
- ISSN
- 0022-2186 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5285
- OpenAlex
- W1983452308
- Cited by
- 256
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 13.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.