The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising
Abstract
This study uses agency theory to develop testable implications about three provisions commonly observed in franchise contracts: (1) restrictions on passive ownership, (2) area development plans, and (3) mandatory advertising expenditures. The primary hypothesis is that these provisions are most likely when there are significant externalities among the units within the franchise system. The evidence, based on a large sample of franchise contracts, is generally consistent with this hypothesis. The evidence also suggests that these incentive instruments are complements. In contrast to the theory, most of the results do not support the hypothesis that the percentage of company‐owned units is related to externalities within the system. Franchisee risk aversion and/or wealth constraints appear more important. While the study focuses on franchising, the results provide insights into related provisions in other contracts.
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Cites
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
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Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
The theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract
Rubin, P. H. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466918 · Cited by 1,005
Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets
Caves, R. E., & II, W. F. M. (1976) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1056250 · Cited by 694
Multi-unit franchising: Growth and management issues
Kaufmann, P. J., & Dant, R. P. (1996) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/0883-9026(96)00057-2 · Cited by 285
Cited by
The Economics of Hybrid Organizations
Ménard, C. (2004) · Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics · doi:10.1628/0932456041960605 · Cited by 1,123
Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence
Lafontaine, F., & Slade, M. (2007) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.45.3.629 · Cited by 711
Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences
Macher, J. T., & Richman, B. D. (2008) · Business and Politics · doi:10.2202/1469-3569.1210 · Cited by 535
Anderson, S. W., & Dekker, H. C. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1050.0456 · Cited by 389
Blair, R. D., & Lafontaine, F. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511753879 · Cited by 364
Complementarity and Evolution of Contractual Provisions: An Empirical Study of IT Services Contracts
Argyres, N. S., Bercovitz, J., & Mayer, K. J. (2007) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1060.0220 · Cited by 363
Dunning, J. H., Pak, Y. S., & Beldona, S. (2007) · International Business Review · doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2007.01.005 · Cited by 68
Contractual Design as a Determinant of Performance: Evidence from Franchising
Chaudey, M., & Fadairo, M. (2008) · International Journal of the Economics of Business · doi:10.1080/13571510701830556 · Cited by 19
Metadata
- Authors
- Brickley, J. A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Law and Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1999-10
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 745-774
- ISSN
- 0022-2186 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5285
- OpenAlex
- W2050654912
- Cited by
- 205
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 14.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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