The DOI matches its Crossref record, with a small difference in title or year; the references it cites are not checked yet.
Multi-unit franchising: Growth and management issues
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Agency theory contends that to deal with agents' shirking behaviors, the principal must either monitor the behavior of agents or provide the incentive of residual claims to downstream profits.
“Based on the premise that parties will be driven by self-interest, agency theory contends that to deal with agent's shirking behaviors, the principal has to (1) either monitor the behavior of agents (input control mechanism), or (2) provide the incentive of residual claims to downstream profits, so that motives for shirking are minimized or eliminated (output control mechanism) (Kaufmann and Dant”
From Control techniques and upward flow of information in franchising in distant markets: conceptualization and preliminary evidence (1998) · cites this paper as Kaufmann and Dant 1996
Multi-unit franchising seems to be a dominant form of ownership structure within business format franchising.
“Though multi-unit franchising seems to be a dominant form of ownership structure within business format franchising (Bradach 1995;Kaufmann and Dant 1996;Kaufmann and Kim 1995), most franchising studies have focused on single-unit franchising.”
From Control techniques and upward flow of information in franchising in distant markets: conceptualization and preliminary evidence (1998) · cites this paper as Kaufmann and Dant 1996
Prior research has referred to a high proportion of multi-unit franchisees in general, and this may be especially true within distant markets.
“Researchers have previously referred to the high proportion of multi-unit franchisees in general (Bradach 1995;Kaufmann and Dant 1996;Kaufmann and Kim 1994), but this may be especially true within distant markets (Zietlow and Hennart 1997;Kalnins and Lafontaine 1997).”
From Control techniques and upward flow of information in franchising in distant markets: conceptualization and preliminary evidence (1998) · cites this paper as Kaufmann and Dant 1996
The use of more complex organizational forms is associated with higher system growth rates.
“The empirical results of Kaufmann and Kim (1995) and Kaufmann and Dant (1996) also indicate that the use of these more complex organizational forms is associated with higher system growth rates.”
From Control techniques and upward flow of information in franchising in distant markets: conceptualization and preliminary evidence (1998) · cites this paper as Kaufmann and Dant 1996
Most contemporary franchised units belong to minichains owned by multi-unit franchisees.
“Most contemporary franchised units belong to minichains owned by multi-unit franchisees (Bradach 1995;Kaufmann and Dant 1996;Kaufmann and Kim 1994).”
From Control techniques and upward flow of information in franchising in distant markets: conceptualization and preliminary evidence (1998) · cites this paper as Kaufmann and Dant 1996
Citations
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References 38 · Cited by 285
Research works printed but not linked: 31
- Alchian, 1972, Production, information costs, and economics of organization, American Economic Review, 62, 777
- Baucus, 1996, Consensus in franchise organizations: A cooperative arrangement among entrepreneurs, 10.1016/0883-9026(96)00055-9 · DOI · Paper page
- Bergen, 1992, Agency relationships in marketing: A review of the implications and applications of agency and related theories, Journal of Marketing, 56, 1, 10.2307/1252293 · DOI
- Blair, 1982, Optimal franchising, Southern Economic Journal, 494, 10.2307/1058499 · DOI
- Brickley, 1987, The choice of organizational form, Journal of Financial Economics, 18, 401, 10.1016/0304-405X(87)90046-8 · DOI · Paper page
- Brickley, 1991, An Agency perspective on franchising, Financial Management, 27, 10.2307/3666094 · DOI
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- Dant, 1996, Modeling cooperative advertising decisions in franchising, Journal of the Operations Research Society, 10.1057/jors.1996.141 · DOI · Paper page
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- Dant, 1992, Conflict resolution processes in contractual channels of distribution, Journal of Marketing, 56, 38, 10.2307/1252131 · DOI
- Faith, 1994, Managerial rents and outside recruitment in the Coasian firm, American Economic Review, 74, 660
- Jensen, 1983, Organization theory and methodology, Accounting Review, 50, 319
- Kaufmann, 1995, The case against mandatory earnings claim disclosure, Franchise Law Journal, 15, 3
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- Kaufmann, 1992, The impact of managerial performance decay on franchisors' store allocation strategies, Journal of Marketing Channels, 1, 51, 10.1300/J049v01n04_05 · DOI
- Kaufmann, 1995, Master franchising and system growth rates, Journal of Marketing Channels, 4, 49, 10.1300/J049v04n01_04 · DOI · Paper page
- Kaufmann, 1994, Costs of control: The source of economic rents for McDonald's franchisees, Journal of Law and Economics, 37, 417, 10.1086/467319 · DOI
- Lafontaine, 1992, Contract theory and franchising: Some empirical results, Rand Journal of Economics, 23, 263, 10.2307/2555988 · DOI
- Lafontaine, 1994, The evolution of ownership patterns in franchise systems, Journal of Retailing, 70, 97, 10.1016/0022-4359(94)90010-8 · DOI · Paper page
- Lal, 1990, Improving channel coordination through franchising, Marketing Science, 9, 299, 10.1287/mksc.9.4.299 · DOI
- Mathewson, 1985, The economics of franchise contracts, Journal of Law and Economics, 28, 503, 10.1086/467099 · DOI
- Muris, 1981, Opportunistic behavior and the law of contracts, Minnesota Law Review, 65, 521
- Norton, 1988, Franchising, brand name capital, and the entrepreneurial capacity problem, Strategic Management Journal, 9, 105, 10.1002/smj.4250090711 · DOI
- Norton, 1988, An empirical look at franchising as an organizational form, Journal of Business, 61, 197, 10.1086/296428 · DOI
- Oxenfeldt, 1968, Will successful franchise systems ultimately become wholly owned chains?, Journal of Retailing, 44, 69
- Oxenfeldt, 1968, Franchising in perspective, Journal of Retailing, 44, 3
- Rubin, 1978, The theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract, Journal of Law and Economics, 21, 223, 10.1086/466918 · DOI · Paper page
- Rudnitsky, 1995, Leaner cuisine, Forbes, 27, 43
- Sen, 1993, The use of initial fees and royalties in business format franchising, Managerial and Decision Economics, 14, 175, 10.1002/mde.4090140209 · DOI
- Shane, 1995, Hybrid organizational arrangements and their implications for firm growth and survival: A study of new franchisors, Academy of Management Journal
Metadata
- Authors
- Kaufmann, P. J., & Dant, R. P.
- Affiliations
- Georgia State University (US)
- Boston University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Kaufmann, Patrick J.
- Venue
- Journal of Business Venturing
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1996-09
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 343-358
- ISSN
- 0883-9026 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2044746402
- Cited by
- 285
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 15 · 2012: 8
- FWCI
- 34.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Business Venturing (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Franchising Strategies and Performance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management of Technology and Innovation › Entrepreneurship Studies and Influences
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Accounting and Organizational Management
- Keywords
- franchising, fast food chains, access to capital
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