The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Who Marries Whom and Why
Open accessAbstract
This paper proposes and estimates a static transferable utility model of the marriage market. The model generates a nonparametric marriage matching function with spillover effects. It rationalizes the standard interpretation of marriage rate regressions and points out its limitations. The model was used to estimate U.S. marital behavior in 1971/72 and 1981/82. The marriage matching function estimates show that the gains to marriage for young adults fell substantially over the decade. Unlike contradictory marriage rate regression results, the marriage matching function estimates showed that the legalization of abortion had a significant quantitative impact on the fall in the gains to marriage for young men and women.
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Cites
Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior
McFadden, D. L. (1972) · eScholarship (California Digital Library) · Cited by 14,203
Hedonic prices and implicit markets: product differentiation in pure competition
Rosen, S. (1974) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260169 · Cited by 10,603
Becker, G. S. (1991) · doi:10.4159/9780674020665 · Cited by 10,565
Becker, G. S. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260084 · Cited by 3,484
Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.
Kamecke, U., Roth, A. E., & Sotomayor, M. A. O. (1992) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2554894 · Cited by 1,625
Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market
Lundberg, S., & Pollak, R. A. (1993) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261912 · Cited by 1,544
The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions
Goldin, C., & Katz, L. F. (2002) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/340778 · Cited by 1,389
Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor Supply
Chiappori, P., Fortin, B., & Lacroix, G. (2002) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/324385 · Cited by 901
Becker, G. S. (1974) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260287 · Cited by 898
Assortative Matching and Search
Shimer, R., & Smith, L. (2000) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00112 · Cited by 761
Cited by
Matching and Sorting in Online Dating
Hitsch, G. J., Hortaçsu, A., & Ariely, D. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.1.130 · Cited by 665
What makes you click?—Mate preferences in online dating
Hitsch, G. J., Hortaçsu, A., & Ariely, D. (2010) · Quantitative Marketing and Economics · doi:10.1007/s11129-010-9088-6 · Cited by 450
Educational Assortative Mating and Household Income Inequality
Eika, L., Mogstad, M., & Zafar, B. (2019) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/702018 · Cited by 282
Bride price and female education
Ashraf, N., Bau, N., Nunn, N., & Voena, A. (2020) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/704572 · Cited by 271
Metadata
- Authors
- Choo, E., & Siow, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2006-02
- Volume
- 114
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 175-201
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2075002587
- Cited by
- 631
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 43.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.