The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps
Open accessAbstract
This paper introduces signaling in a global game so as to examine the informational role of policy in coordination environments such as currency crises and bank runs. While exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium, we show that the endogenous information generated by policy interventions leads to multiple equilibria. The policy maker is thus trapped into a position in which self‐fulfilling expectations dictate not only the coordination outcome but also the optimal policy. This result does not rely on the freedom to choose out‐of‐equilibrium beliefs, nor on the policy being a public signal; it may obtain even if the policy is observed with idiosyncratic noise.
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Citations
Cites
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261155 · Cited by 9,369
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. M. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885060 · Cited by 3,201
Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities
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Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
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Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
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Demand–Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs
GOLDSTEIN, I., & PAUZNER, A. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00762.x · Cited by 1,199
Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features
Obstfeld, M. (1996) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(95)00111-5 · Cited by 1,057
Rational and Self-Fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises
Obstfeld, M. (1984) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w1486 · Cited by 946
Global Games: Theory and Applications
Morris, S., & Shin, H. S. (2010) · Advances in Economics and Econometrics · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610240.004 · Cited by 926
Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks
Morris, S., & Shin, H. S. (2002) · New Research in Financial Markets · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199243211.003.0009 · Cited by 911
Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right after All?
Rochet, J.-C., & Vives, X. (2004) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/1542476042813850 · Cited by 815
Calvo, G. A. (1989) · Contributions to Economic Analysis · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-87387-3.50017-7 · Cited by 450
Morris, S., & Shin, H. S. (2004) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1023/b:eufi.0000022155.98681.25 · Cited by 362
Crises and Prices: Information Aggregation, Multiplicity and Volatility
Angeletos, G.-M., & Werning, I. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.3386/w11015 · Cited by 330
Self-citationCrises and Prices: Information Aggregation, Multiplicity, and Volatility
Angeletos, G.-M., & Werning, I. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1720 · Cited by 317
Self-citationPublic Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games
Hellwig, C. (2002) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.2002.2947 · Cited by 177
Self-citationSelf-Fulfilling Currency Crises: The Role of Interest Rates
Hellwig, C., Mukherji, A., & Tsyvinski, A. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1769 · Cited by 168
Self-citationRethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modeling
Morris, S. E., & Shin, H. S. (2000) · NBER Macroeconomics Annual · doi:10.1086/654411 · Cited by 157
CHAMLEY, C. P. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556160 · Cited by 129
Information Manipulation, Coordination and Regime ChangePreprint
Edmond, C. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1026312 · Cited by 125
Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change
Edmond, C. (2011) · doi:10.3386/w17395 · Cited by 32
Cited by
Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
Edmond, C. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt020 · Cited by 433
Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks
Angeletos, G.-M., Hellwig, C., & Pavan, A. (2007) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00766.x · Cited by 350
Self-citationCrises and Prices: Information Aggregation, Multiplicity, and Volatility
Angeletos, G.-M., & Werning, I. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1720 · Cited by 317
Self-citationRegime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs
DE MESQUITA, E. B. (2010) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000274 · Cited by 304
Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change
Edmond, C. (2011) · doi:10.3386/w17395 · Cited by 32
Metadata
- Authors
- Angeletos, G., Hellwig, C., & Pavan, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2006-06
- Volume
- 114
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 452-484
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1787709854
- Cited by
- 280
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 15.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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