The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia
Abstract
This paper presents a randomized field experiment on reducing corruption in over 600 Indonesian village road projects. I find that increasing government audits from 4 percent of projects to 100 percent reduced missing expenditures, as measured by discrepancies between official project costs and an independent engineers’ estimate of costs, by eight percentage points. By contrast, increasing grassroots participation in monitoring had little average impact, reducing missing expenditures only in situations with limited free‐rider problems and limited elite capture. Overall, the results suggest that traditional top‐down monitoring can play an important role in reducing corruption, even in a highly corrupt environment.
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Cites
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Recent Developments in the Econometrics of Program Evaluation
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Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit
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Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.4.1274 · Cited by 975
Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little?
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2014) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.28.4.99 · Cited by 819
Metadata
- Authors
- Olken, B. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2007-04
- Volume
- 115
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 200-249
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2130799276
- Cited by
- 1,593
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 134.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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