The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An‐arrgh‐chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization
Abstract
This article investigates the internal governance institutions of violent criminal enterprise by examining the law, economics, and organization of pirates. To effectively organize their banditry, pirates required mechanisms to prevent internal predation, minimize crew conflict, and maximize piratical profit. Pirates devised two institutions for this purpose. First, I analyze the system of piratical checks and balances crews used to constrain captain predation. Second, I examine how pirates used democratic constitutions to minimize conflict and create piratical law and order. Pirate governance created sufficient order and cooperation to make pirates one of the most sophisticated and successful criminal organizations in history.
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Cites
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An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang's Finances*
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The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law
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The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not
Skaperdas, S. (2001) · Economics of Governance · doi:10.1007/pl00011026 · Cited by 337
The enterprise of law : justice without the state
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The Economics of Organised Crime
(1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511751882 · Cited by 323
Cited by
SKARBEK, D. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000335 · Cited by 336
Davidson, S., De Filippi, P., & Potts, J. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2744751 · Cited by 308
Vergne, J. P. (2026) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/joms.70048 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Leeson, P. T.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2007-12
- Volume
- 115
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1049-1094
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2159329960
- Cited by
- 343
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 26.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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