Securing Private Property: Formal versus Informal Institutions
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Property rights are one of the most fundamental and highly robust institutions supporting economic performance. However, the channels through which property rights are achieved are not adequately identified. This paper is a first step toward unbundling the black box of property rights into a formal and an informal component. We empirically determine the significance of both informal and formal rules in securing property rights. We find that when both components are included in the analysis, the impact of formal constraints is greatly diminished, while informal constraints are highly significant in explaining the security of property. These results are robust to a variety of model specifications, multiple instrumental variables, and a range of control variables.
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Citations
Cites
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BackgroundThe colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation
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“Settler mortality and population density in 1500 is argued by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002) as affecting settlement patterns that determined past institutions.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialTesting for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression
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The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
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A Theory of Cultural Values and Some Implications for Work
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“Higher Schwartz (1994, 1999) score suggests an emphasis on accepting the world as is, instead of trying to change it.”
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“(2004) argue that Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) incorrectly assert that colonizers impact current institutions. Instead, Glaeser et al. show that the Europeans brought their human capital, not their institutions, impacting current economic performance. They show that settler mortality is more correlated with human capi…”
BackgroundTropics, germs, and crops: How endowments influence economic development
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Cited by
Informal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic performance
Williamson, C. R. (2009) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9399-x · Cited by 484
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Williamson, C. R., & Kerekes, C. B.
- Venue
- The Journal of Law and Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2011-08
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 537-572
- ISSN
- 0022-2186 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5285
- OpenAlex
- W2069735229
- Cited by
- 191
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 24.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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