The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Nonepistemic Values and the Multiple Goals of Science
Abstract
Recent efforts to argue that nonepistemic values have a legitimate role to play in assessing scientific models, theories, and hypotheses typically either reject the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values or incorporate nonepistemic values only as a secondary consideration for resolving epistemic uncertainty. Given that scientific representations can legitimately be evaluated not only based on their fit with the world but also with respect to their fit with the needs of their users, we show in two case studies that nonepistemic values can play a legitimate role as factors that override epistemic considerations in assessing scientific representations for practical purposes.
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Citations
Cites
The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change
Kuhn, T. S. (1977) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226217239.001.0001 · Cited by 3,861
The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory
Duhem, P. M. M. (1954) · doi:10.1515/9780691233857 · Cited by 2,128
Longino, H. E. (2002) · doi:10.1515/9780691187013 · Cited by 1,622
Is a Little Pollution Good for You?
Elliott, K. (2011) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199755622.001.0001 · Cited by 193
Self-citation
Cited by
Decolonial AI: Decolonial Theory as Sociotechnical Foresight in Artificial Intelligence
Mohamed, S., Png, M.-T., & Isaac, W. (2020) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-020-00405-8 · Cited by 912
“There is strong consensus that non-epistemic values have a legitimate role in scientific reasoning, particularly in the choice of research projects and the application of scientific results (Elliott and McKaughan 2014; Douglas 2007).”
BackgroundModel Evaluation: An Adequacy-for-Purpose View
Parker, W. S. (2020) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/708691 · Cited by 310
In Conversation with Artificial Intelligence: Aligning language Models with Human Values
Kasirzadeh, A., & Gabriel, I. (2023) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-023-00606-x · Cited by 127
Value-entanglement and the integrity of scientific research
Resnik, D. B., & Elliott, K. C. (2019) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.12.011 · Cited by 49
Self-citationScience, Values, and the New Demarcation Problem
Resnik, D. B., & Elliott, K. C. (2023) · Journal for General Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s10838-022-09633-2 · Cited by 49
“On the other hand, if they allow scientific practices to vary based on the specific needs or concerns of particular users (e.g., Elliott and McKaughan 2014; Parker and Lusk 2019), then they create the potential for confusion because it is difficult to be entirely transparent about all the ways in…”
BackgroundResultInfluentialSelf-citationIn conversation with Artificial Intelligence: aligning language models with human values
Kasirzadeh, A., & Gabriel, I. (2022) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2209.00731 · Cited by 128
“29 Given that the focus is on scientific discourse, the cooperative goal of the discourse can be understood in relation to the diverse aims of the sciences [32, 78, 79].”
BackgroundGood AI for the Present of Humanity Democratizing AI Governance
Corrêa, N., & Fernandes de Oliveira, N. (2021) · AI Ethics Journal · doi:10.47289/aiej20210716-2 · Cited by 6
Metadata
- Authors
- Elliott, K. C., & McKaughan, D. J.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2014-01
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-21
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2034052355
- Cited by
- 222
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 69.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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