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Cited by 49Philosophy, Science, and HistoryPhilosophy and History of ScienceFeminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Value-entanglement and the integrity of scientific research

Open access
Resnik, David B., Elliott, Kevin C.·2019·Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.12.011PMC PMC12614358
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Abstract

Throughout much of the 20th century, philosophers of science maintained a position known as the value-free ideal, which holds that non-epistemic (e.g., moral, social, political, or economic) values should not influence the evaluation and acceptance of scientific results. In the last few decades, many philosophers of science have rejected this position by arguing that non-epistemic values can and should play an important role in scientific judgment and decision-making in a variety of contexts, including the evaluation and acceptance of scientific results. Rejecting the value-free ideal creates some new and vexing problems, however. One of these is that relinquishing this philosophical doctrine may undermine the integrity of scientific research if practicing scientists decide to allow non-epistemic values to impact their judgment and decision-making. A number of prominent philosophers of science have sought to show how one can reject the value-free ideal without compromising the integrity of scientific research. In this paper, we examine and critique their views and offer our own proposal for protecting and promoting scientific integrity. We argue that the literature on research ethics and its focus on adherence to norms, rules, policies, and procedures that together promote the aims of science can provide a promising foundation for building an account of scientific integrity. These norms, rules, policies, and procedures provide a level of specificity that is lacking in most philosophical discussions of science and values, and they suggest an important set of tasks for those working in science and values-namely, assessing, justifying, and prioritizing them. Thus, we argue that bringing together the literature on research ethics with the literature on science and values will enrich both areas and generate a more sophisticated and detailed account of scientific integrity.

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Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. Diamond C (2001). Integrity. In Becker L, & Becker C (Eds.). Encyclopedia of ethics (pp. 863– 866). (2nd ed.). New York, NJ: Routedge.
  2. Douglas H (2018). Science and values: The pervasive entanglement. In Zachary G, & Richards T (Eds.). The rightful place of science: Values, science and democracy (the descartes lectures). Tempe, AZ: Consortium for science, policy & outcomes (forthcoming).
  3. Heil J (1983). Believing where one ought. The Journal of Philosophy, 80(11), 752– 763.
  4. Kincaid H, Dupré J, & Wylie A (Eds.). (2007). Value-free science? Ideals and illusions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  5. Kuhn T (1978). The essential tension. Chicago, IL: University Chicago Press.
  6. Longino H (1990). Science as social knowledge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  7. Solomon M (2001). Social empiricism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  8. Staley K (2017). Decisions: Inductive risk and the higgs boson. In Elliott K, & Richards T (Eds.). Exploring inductive risk: Case studies of values in science (pp. 37– 57). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

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Authors
Resnik, D. B., & Elliott, K. C.
Affiliations
  • National Institutes of Health (US)
  • Michigan State University (US)
Corresponding author
Resnik, David B.
ORCID
Venue
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2019-06
Volume
75
Pages
1-11
ISSN
0039-3681 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.12.011
PMC
PMC12614358
OpenAlex
W2906203548
Cited by
49
References
97
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 2
FWCI
24.22
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
Funders
  • Intramural Program of the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS)
  • National Institutes of Health
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
Keywords
value-free ideal, scientific integrity, non-epistemic values, research ethics, science and values, scientific judgment
MeSH terms
Philosophy, Research Design, Social Values, Knowledge, Ethics, Research

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