Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of American Legislatures
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 69 of the 69 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article demonstrates that limits on campaign contributions—which alter a candidate’s ability to raise money from certain types of donors—affect the ideologies of legislators in office. Using an original data set of campaign contribution limits in some US states over the last 20 years, I exploit variation across and within states over time to show that higher individual contributions lead to the selection of more polarized legislators, while higher limits on contributions from political action committees (PACs) lead to the selection of more moderate legislators. Individual donors prefer to support ideologically extreme candidates while access-seeking PACs tend to support more moderate candidates. Thus, institutional changes that limit the availability of money affect the types of candidates who would normally fund-raise from these two main sources of campaign funds. These results show that the connection between donors and candidates is an important part of the story of the polarization of American politics.
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Cited by
Policy Preferences and Policy Change: Dynamic Responsiveness in the American States, 1936–2014
CAUGHEY, D., & WARSHAW, C. (2018) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055417000533 · Cited by 340
Polarization: What Everyone Needs to Know®
McCarty, N. (2019) · doi:10.1093/wentk/9780190867782.001.0001 · Cited by 280
From Backwaters to Major Policymakers: Policy Polarization in the States, 1970–2014
Grumbach, J. M. (2018) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s153759271700425x · Cited by 275
Interventions to reduce partisan animosity
Hartman, R., Blakey, W., Womick, J., Bail, C., Finkel, E. J., Han, H., Sarrouf, J., Schroeder, J., Sheeran, P., Van Bavel, J. J., et al. (2022) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-022-01442-3 · Cited by 171
Laboratories of Democratic Backsliding
GRUMBACH, J. M. (2023) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055422000934 · Cited by 135
“…be interested in investigating the role of interest groups or money in politics on state democratic performance (Anzia and Moe 2017; Hertel-Fernandez 2016), perhaps by exploiting variation in state campaign finance policy (Barber 2016; La Raja and Schaffner 2015) or election timing (Anzia 2011).”
Interest Group Activists and the Polarization of State Legislatures
Grumbach, J. M. (2020) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/lsq.12244 · Cited by 21
Metadata
- Authors
- Barber, M. J.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2016-01
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 296-310
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2272661239
- Cited by
- 191
- References
- 69
- FWCI
- 58.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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