Careers, Connections, and Corruption Risks: Investigating the Impact of Bureaucratic Meritocracy on Public Procurement Processes
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Why do officials in some countries favor entrenched contractors, while others assign public contracts more impartially? This article emphasizes the important interplay between politics and bureaucracy. It suggests that corruption risks are lower when bureaucrats’ careers do not depend on political connections but on their peers. We test this hypothesis with a novel measure of career incentives in the public sector—using a survey of more than 18,000 public sector employees in 212 European regions—and a new objective corruption risk measure including over 1.4 million procurement contracts. Both show a remarkable subnational variation across Europe. The study finds that corruption risks are indeed significantly lower where bureaucrats’ career incentives exclusively follow professional criteria. In substantial terms, moving EU regions so that bureaucrats’ merit and effort would matter as much as in, for example, Baden-Wüttemberg (90th percentile) could lead to a 13–20 billion Euro savings per year.
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Cites
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Cited by
(2020) · OECD Working Papers on Public Governance · doi:10.1787/ed8235c8-en · Cited by 499
Lights on the shadows of public procurement: Transparency as an antidote to corruption
Bauhr, M., Czibik, Á., de Fine Licht, J., & Fazekas, M. (2020) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12432 · Cited by 131
Self-citationCorruption risk in contracting markets: a network science perspective
Wachs, J., Fazekas, M., & Kertész, J. (2021) · International Journal of Data Science and Analytics · doi:10.1007/s41060-019-00204-1 · Cited by 73
Self-citationDefining Bureaucratic Autonomy
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Metadata
- Authors
- Charron, N., Dahlström, C., Fazekas, M., & Lapuente, V.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2017-01
- Volume
- 79
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 89-104
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2541781630
- Cited by
- 154
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 30.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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