William James’s Objection to Epiphenomenalism
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James developed an evolutionary objection to epiphenomenalism that is still discussed today. Epiphenomenalists have offered responses that do not grasp its full depth. I thus offer a new reading and assessment of James’s objection. Our life-essential, phenomenal pleasures and pains have three features that suggest that they were shaped by selection, according to James: they are natively patterned, those patterns are systematically linked with antecedent brain states, and the patterns are “universal” among humans. If epiphenomenalism were true, phenomenal patterns could not have been selected (because epiphenomenalism precludes phenomenal consciousness affecting reproductive success). So epiphenomenalism is likely false.
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Bodily pains are adaptive by deep adaptive alignment-the more serious the damage, the worse the pain.
“James argues that bodily pains are adaptive not just because of a general adaptive alignment, but also by their deep adaptive alignment—that the more serious the damage, the worse the pain.”
From The social origins of consciousness (2025) · cites this paper as [60]
Klein’s discussion of James’s argument (section 2, page unavailable) describes a stable pattern among life-essential pains: breaking a limb normally hurts more than a lesser injury. A later passage says the more distasteful of two pains is *very likely* to arise from a more threatening bodily state. The claim captures that alignment but presents it as an unqualified rule for bodily pains. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredLife-essential phenomenal pleasures and pains are complexly organized, linked with beneficial and harmful brain and bodily states, and universal across humans.
“James offers three reasons to think that ‘life-essential, phenomenal pleasures and pains’ [60] are adaptive: they are complexly organized; they are linked with beneficial and harmful brain and bodily states; and these patterns are universal across humans.”
From The social origins of consciousness (2025) · cites this paper as [60]
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Flagged first, then by citations
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- Authors
- Klein, A.
- Affiliations
- McMaster University (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Klein, Alexander
- ORCID
- Klein, Alexander
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2019-12
- Volume
- 86
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1179-1190
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2962129683
- Cited by
- 45
- References
- 26
- Citations by year
- 2025: 17 · 2024: 25 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1
- FWCI
- 0.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- William James, epiphenomenalism, phenomenal consciousness, natural selection, brain states, reproductive success, philosophy of mind
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