Is Consciousness a Spandrel?
Abstract
Determining the biological function of phenomenal consciousness appears necessary to explain its origin: evolution by natural selection operates on organisms’ traits based on the biological functions they fulfill. But identifying the function of phenomenal consciousness has proven difficult. Some have proposed that the function of phenomenal consciousness is to facilitate mental processes such as reasoning or learning. But mental processes such as reasoning and learning seem to be possible in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. It is difficult to pinpoint in what way phenomenal consciousness enhances these processes or others like them. In this paper, we explore a possibility that has been neglected to date. Perhaps phenomenal consciousness has no function of its own because it is either a by-product of other traits or a (functionless) accident. If so, then phenomenal consciousness has an evolutionary explanation even though it fulfills no biological function.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The view that byproduct explanations are explanatorily inferior to adaptive explanations is widespread but highly controversial.
“The view that byproduct explanations are explanatorily inferior to adaptive explanations is widespread (see [36] for discussion) but highly controversial.”
From Consciousness at sea (2025) · cites this paper as [36]
Cites
The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme
Gould, S. J., & Lewontin, R. C. (1979) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.1979.0086 · Cited by 7,770 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Instead of an adaptation, consciousness might be a spandrel (in the sense of Gould and Lewontin 1979)—a by-product of some other trait that has adaptive value although consciousness itself has no adaptive value of its own (or may even be dysfunctional).”
BackgroundNagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440 · see citing works
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism
Millikan, R. G. (1984) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4124.001.0001 · Cited by 4,758 · see citing works
The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory
(1996) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-2091 · Cited by 4,150 · see citing works
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364 · see citing works
“Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap
Levine, J. (1983) · Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1983.tb00207.x · Cited by 2,150 · see citing works
Facing up to the problem of consciousness
Chalmers, D. J. (1996) · Toward a Science of Consciousness · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6860.003.0003 · Cited by 1,966 · see citing works
Morton, A., & Publishing, C. (1993) · Cogito · doi:10.5840/cogito19937236 · Cited by 1,369 · see citing works
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
Chalmers, D. J. (1998) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203826430-11 · Cited by 1,334 · see citing works
Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation
Kim, J. (1998) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4629.001.0001 · Cited by 1,241 · cited 2× · see citing works
“This is another version of the causal exclusion argument (cf. Kim 1998).”
BackgroundNagel, T. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199919758.001.0001 · Cited by 971 · see citing works
Block, N. (1993) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2111.003.0006 · Cited by 880 · see citing works
Can We Solve the Mind–Body Problem?
MCGINN, C. (1989) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/xcviii.391.349 · Cited by 745 · see citing works
Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory
Carruthers, P. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487491 · Cited by 632 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…how the world is, to perform certain inferences, to learn in certain ways, to perform voluntary actions, or to possess a representation of ourselves (Carruthers 2000; Dretske 1997; Eccles 1992; Humphrey 2011; Johnston 2006; Kriegel 2004; Place 2000; Ramachandran and Hirstein 1997; Seth 2009;…”
BackgroundMind in a physical world: an essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation
(1999) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.36-6223 · Cited by 594 · see citing works
What Psychological States are Not
Block, N., & Fodor, J. A. (1972) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183991 · Cited by 553 · see citing works
Exaptation: A Crucial Tool for an Evolutionary Psychology
Gould, S. J. (1991) · Journal of Social Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1991.tb01822.x · Cited by 526 · see citing works
Heil, J. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596201.001.0001 · Cited by 437 · see citing works
Papineau, D. (2001) · Physicalism and its Discontents · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511570797.002 · Cited by 436 · see citing works
Phenomenal consciousness a naturalistic theory
Carruthers, P. (2000) · Cited by 414 · see citing works
Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology.
Leeds, S., & Savage, C. W. (1980) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184403 · Cited by 301 · see citing works
Better than Mere Knowledge? The Function of Sensory Awareness
Johnston, M. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.003.0008 · Cited by 215 · see citing works
Eccles, J. C. (1992) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.89.16.7320 · Cited by 180 · see citing works
Consciousness and its function
ROSENTHAL, D. M. (2007) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.11.012 · Cited by 162 · see citing works
Humphrey, N. K. (2011) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400838073 · Cited by 128 · see citing works
What Difference Does Consciousness Make?
Gulick, R. V. (1989) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics198917119 · Cited by 116 · see citing works
Three laws of qualia: what neurology tells us about the biological functions of consciousness
Ramachandran, V. S., & Hirstein, W. (1997) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 102 · see citing works
Consciousness and Self-Consciousness
Kriegel, U. (2004) · The Monist · doi:10.5840/monist20048725 · Cited by 84 · see citing works
Consciousness as a Scientific Concept: A Philosophy of Science Perspective
Irvine, E. (2013) · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-5173-6 · Cited by 84 · see citing works
Soul dust: the magic of consciousness
(2011) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.49-0568 · Cited by 75 · see citing works
Adaptive Complexity and Phenomenal Consciousness
Nichols, S., & Grantham, T. A. (2000) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/392859 · Cited by 60 · see citing works
Zombies and the function of consciousness
Flanagan, O., & Polger, T. W. (1995) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · Cited by 59 · see citing works
Deconstructing Dreams: The Spandrels of Sleep
Flanagan, O. (1995) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2940806 · Cited by 56 · see citing works
Seth, A. K. (2009) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-443-29258-3.00057-4 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
Tye, M. (1996) · Noûs · doi:10.2307/2216271 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
DRETSKE, F. I. (1997) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.1997.10717471 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
The Causal Potency of Qualia: Its Nature and Its Source
Place, U. T. (2000) · Brain and Mind · doi:10.1023/a:1010023129393 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
Consciousness, adaptation and epiphenomenalism
Polger, T. W., & Flanagan, O. (2002) · Advances in consciousness research · doi:10.1075/aicr.34.06pol · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Sufka, K. J. (2000) · Brain and Mind · doi:10.1023/a:1010032508495 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Trehub, A. (2013) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
William James’s Objection to Epiphenomenalism
Klein, A. (2019) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/705477 · Cited by 45 · see citing works
What if Consciousness has no Function?
Belardinelli, S., & Pievani, T. (2023) · Biosemiotics · doi:10.1007/s12304-023-09533-y · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Mikhalevich, I. (2025) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2024.0313 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
- Authors
- ROBINSON, Z., MALEY, C. J., & PICCININI, G.
- Affiliations
- University of Missouri–St. Louis (US)
- University of Kansas (US)
- Venue
- Journal of the American Philosophical Association
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2015
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 365-383
- ISSN
- 2053-4477 (ISSN-L)
- 2053-4485
- OpenAlex
- W2129474827
- Cited by
- 88
- References
- 40
- Citations by year
- 2026: 12 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 1
- FWCI
- 1.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of the American Philosophical Association (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- phenomenal consciousness, spandrels, biological function, evolution of consciousness, natural selection, evolutionary explanation, by-products, functionalism, origin of consciousness
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
