The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
ESTIMATING THE DETERMINANTS OF TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE WITH EXPERIMENTAL DATA
Abstract
The fundamental difficulty in empirical work on taxpayer compliance is the absence of detailed and reliable information on individual compliance choices. This paper uses data from laboratory experiments to estimate individual responses to tax, penalty, and audit rate changes, as well as to changes in government expenditures. The empirical results confirm some (although not all) theoretical predictions, and compare quantitatively with other empirical work. Taxpayer reporting increases with greater audit and penalty rates; however, these responses are not large. Compliance is also greater when individuals face a lower tax rate and when they receive something for their taxes.
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Cites
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Cited by
Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The “slippery slope” framework
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Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion
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Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration
Slemrod, J., & Yitzhaki, S. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7473 · Cited by 843
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Metadata
- Authors
- ALM, J., JACKSON, B. R., & MCKEE, M.
- Venue
- National Tax Journal
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1992-03-01
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 107-114
- ISSN
- 0028-0283 (ISSN-L)
- 1944-7477
- OpenAlex
- W162024352
- Cited by
- 527
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 2.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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