The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions
Abstract
“Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind”. Taking its cue from this paraphrase of Kant's famous dictum, this paper intends to explain how the historiography of science should learn from the philosophy of science and vice versa. It will be argued that (a) philosophy of science provides normative methodologies in terms of which the historian reconstructs ‘internal history’ and thereby provides a rational explanation of the growth of objective knowledge; (b) two competing methodologies can be evaluated with the help of (normatively interpreted) history; (c) any rational reconstruction of history needs to be supplemented by an empirical (socio-psychological) ‘external history’. The vital demarcation between normative-internal and empirical-external is different for each methodology. Jointly, internal and external historiographical theories determine to a very large extent the choice of problems for the historian.
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Citations
Cites
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Kuhn, T. S., & Schlegel, R. (1963) · Physics Today · doi:10.1063/1.3050879 · Cited by 35,538
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
(2013) · A Realist Theory of Science · doi:10.4324/9780203090732-9 · Cited by 7,731
Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy
Reid, L. A., & Polanyi, M. (1959) · British Journal of Educational Studies · doi:10.2307/3119338 · Cited by 7,538
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
Lakatos, I. (1970) · Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139171434.009 · Cited by 4,649 · cited 2×
“…them writes: 'At this stage we have not yet developed a general theory of criticism even for scientific theories, let alone for theories of rationality: therefore ifwe want to falsify methodological falsificationism, we have to do it before having a theory of how to do it' (Lakatos, 1970, p. 114).”
BackgroundSelf-citationFalsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
Lakatos, I. (1976) · Can Theories be Refuted? · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1863-0_14 · Cited by 3,915
Self-citationThe Open Society and Its Enemies
Popper, K. (2012) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203439913 · Cited by 3,505
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
Duncan, O. D., & Sills, D. L. (1968) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2092889 · Cited by 3,486
(2020) · Radical Treatment · doi:10.2307/j.ctvw1d7dg.9 · Cited by 3,373
Lehman, H. (1972) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/288419 · Cited by 2,998
Cited by
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
Lakatos, I. (1976) · Can Theories be Refuted? · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1863-0_14 · Cited by 3,915
Self-citationThe Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Many Faces of Constructivism
Phillips, D. C. (1995) · Educational Researcher · doi:10.3102/0013189x024007005 · Cited by 1,330
Meehl, P. E. (1990) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1207/s15327965pli0102_1 · Cited by 673
Changing the Focus: From Nature of Science (NOS) to Features of Science (FOS)
Matthews, M. R. (2012) · Advances in Nature of Science Research · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-2457-0_1 · Cited by 404
Michod, R. E. (1982) · Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics · doi:10.1146/annurev.es.13.110182.000323 · Cited by 351
Metadata
- Authors
- Lakatos, I.
- Venue
- PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1970
- Volume
- 1970
- Pages
- 91-136
- ISSN
- 0270-8647 (ISSN-L)
- 2327-9486
- OpenAlex
- W2112913817
- Cited by
- 779
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 18.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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