The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)
Abstract
This article presents a positive economic theory of the behavior of appellate judges and Justices. The essay argues that the effort to insulate judges from significant economic incentives, through devices such as life tenure and stringent conflict of interest rules, has not rendered judicial behavior immune to economic analysis. Drawing on analogies to the managers of non-profit enterprises, to those who vote in political elections, and to theatrical spectators, the essay models the judicial utility function in terms that allows judges to be seen as ordinary people responding rationally to ordinary incentives. This model provides a theoretical alternative to the common view of judges as Prometheans or saints, and it suggests new ways of looking at such practical issues as the design of the judicial compensation system.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis
Landes, W. M. (1993) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/468159 · Cited by 352
The welfare economics of immigration law: a theoretical survey with an analysis of U.S. policy
Sykes, A. O. (1995) · Justice in Immigration · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511663789.008 · Cited by 305
Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries, and Other Unpublished Works: An Economic Approach
Landes, W. M. (1992) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467901 · Cited by 302
Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools
Picker, R. C. (1992) · The University of Chicago Law Review · doi:10.2307/1599916 · Cited by 286
Cited by
Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron
Sunstein, C. R., & Thaler, R. H. (2003) · The University of Chicago Law Review · doi:10.2307/1600573 · Cited by 1,288
Do Police Reduce Crime? Estimates Using the Allocation of Police Forces After a Terrorist Attack
Di Tella, R., & Schargrodsky, E. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282804322970733 · Cited by 796
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics
Jolls, C., Sunstein, C. R., & Thaler, R. H. (2000) · Behavioral Law and Economics · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139175197.002 · Cited by 749
Crime, Deterrence, and Right‐to‐Carry Concealed Handguns
Lott, Jr., & Mustard, D. B. (1997) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467988 · Cited by 706
Cooter, R. (1998) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/468036 · Cited by 481
The Long-Run Growth in Obesity as a Function of Technological Change
Philipson, T., & Posner, R. (1999) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7423 · Cited by 476
Self-citationCognition And Cost‐Benefit Analysis
Sunstein, C. R. (2000) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/468105 · Cited by 436
Beyond the Precautionary Principle
Sunstein, C. R. (2003) · University of Pennsylvania Law Review · doi:10.2307/3312884 · Cited by 430
Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law
Sunstein, C. R. (2002) · The Yale Law Journal · doi:10.2307/1562234 · Cited by 407
Sunstein, C. R. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.199668 · Cited by 384
The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law
Dam, K. W. (1994) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467923 · Cited by 328
Weisbach, D. A. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.268831 · Cited by 313
7. The Economic Way of Looking at Life
(1996) · Accounting for Tastes · doi:10.4159/9780674020658-008 · Cited by 296
Environmental Violations, Legal Penalties, and Reputation Costs
Karpoff, J. M., Lott, J. R., & Rankine, G. (1998) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.137952 · Cited by 285
Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property Protection of Software
Dam, K. W. (1995) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467962 · Cited by 278
The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights
VOETEN, E. (2008) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055408080398 · Cited by 274
Predictably Incoherent Judgments
Sunstein, C. R., Kahneman, D., Schkade, D., & Ritov, I. (2002) · Stanford Law Review · doi:10.2307/1229618 · Cited by 274
Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law)
Sunstein, C. R., Kahneman, D., & Schkade, D. (1998) · The Yale Law Journal · doi:10.2307/797417 · Cited by 264
Interpretation and Institutions
Sunstein, C. R., & Vermeule, A. (2003) · Michigan Law Review · doi:10.2307/1290510 · Cited by 257
The Long-Run Growth in Obesity as a Function of Technological Change
Posner, R. A., & Philipson, T. J. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.167008 · Cited by 254
Self-citationPerils of Judicial Self-Government in Transitional Societies
Kosař, D. (2016) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781316282519 · Cited by 21
Metadata
- Authors
- Posner, R. A.
- Venue
- Supreme Court Economic Review
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1993-01
- Volume
- 3
- Pages
- 1-41
- ISSN
- 0736-9921 (ISSN-L)
- 2156-6208
- OpenAlex
- W1482088571
- Cited by
- 839
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 12.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.