The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Key agreement, the Algebraic Eraser^{𝑇𝑀}, and lightweight cryptography
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Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“For example, [113] presents a lightweight key agreement protocol (Algebric Eraser, -AE) which makes use of one way E-multiplications.”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [113]
In the citing paper
“However, their complexity increases linearly with the needed security level.”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [113]
Citations
Cited by
IoT Middleware: A Survey on Issues and Enabling technologies
Ngu, A. H. H., Gutierrez, M., Metsis, V., Nepal, S., & Sheng, M. Z. (2016) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2016.2615180 · Cited by 681
Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey
Syed, N. F., Shah, S. W., Shaghaghi, A., Anwar, A., Baig, Z., & Doss, R. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3174679 · Cited by 406
Public Key Exchange Using Semidirect Product of (Semi)Groups
Habeeb, M., Kahrobaei, D., Koupparis, C., & Shpilrain, V. (2013) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-38980-1_30 · Cited by 59
Using Semidirect Product of (Semi)groups in Public Key Cryptography
Kahrobaei, D., & Shpilrain, V. (2016) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-40189-8_14 · Cited by 28
Short expressions of permutations as products and cryptanalysis of the Algebraic Eraser
Kalka, A., Teicher, M., & Tsaban, B. (2012) · Advances in Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1016/j.aam.2012.03.001 · Cited by 16
A Practical Cryptanalysis of the Algebraic Eraser
Ben-Zvi, A., Blackburn, S. R., & Tsaban, B. (2016) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4_7 · Cited by 15
On the Security of the Algebraic Eraser Tag Authentication Protocol
Blackburn⋆, S. R., & Robshaw, M. J. B. (2016) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_1 · Cited by 13
A Practical Cryptanalysis of WalnutDSA$$^{\text {TM}}$$
Hart, D., Kim, D., Micheli, G., Pascual-Perez, G., Petit, C., & Quek, Y. (2018) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-76578-5_13 · Cited by 12
Blackburn⋆, S. R., Cid, C., & Mullan, C. (2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511842467.008 · Cited by 11
Certificateless based Quantum Cryptosystem for Ad-Hoc UWB-IR
Miri, J., Nsiri, B., & Bouallègue, R. (2020) · Wireless Personal Communications · doi:10.1007/s11277-020-07449-1 · Cited by 8
MOBS: Matrices Over Bit Strings Public Key Exchange
Rahman, N., & Shpilrain, V. (2024) · La Matematica · doi:10.1007/s44007-024-00114-0 · Cited by 6
GROUP THEORY IN CRYPTOGRAPHYPreprint
Ciaran Mullan, E. A. (2009) · Cited by 5
Ironwood meta key agreement and authentication protocol
Anshel, I. L., Atkins, D., Goldfeld, D. M., & Gunnells, P. E. (2020) · Advances in Mathematics of Communications · doi:10.3934/amc.2020073 · Cited by 4
Self-citationWalnutDSA™: a group theoretic digital signature algorithm
Anshel, I. L., Atkins, D., Goldfeld, D. M., & Gunnells, P. E. (2020) · International Journal of Computer Mathematics Computer Systems Theory · doi:10.1080/23799927.2020.1831613 · Cited by 4
Self-citationAttack on Kayawood protocol: uncloaking private keys
Kotov, M., Menshov, A., & Ushakov, A. (2020) · Journal of Mathematical Cryptology · doi:10.1515/jmc-2019-0015 · Cited by 2
Building Group Key Establishment on Group Theory: A Modular Approach
Bohli, J.-M., Vasco, M. I. G., & Steinwandt, R. (2020) · Symmetry · doi:10.3390/sym12020197 · Cited by 2
The Cracking of WalnutDSA: A Survey
Pablos, J. I. E., Vasco, M. I. G., Marriaga, M. E., & del Pozo, Á. L. P. (2019) · Symmetry · doi:10.3390/sym11091072 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Anshel, I., Anshel, M., Goldfeld, D., & Lemieux, S.
- ORCID
- Goldfeld, Dorian
- Venue
- Contemporary Mathematics
- Publisher
- American Mathematical Society
- Published
- 2006
- Pages
- 1-34
- ISSN
- 0271-4132 (ISSN-L)
- 1098-3627
- OpenAlex
- W4234421690
- Cited by
- 17
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2024: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2016: 4 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 1
- Type
- other
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Contemporary mathematics - American Mathematical Society (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics › Coding theory and cryptography
- Keywords
- key exchange, lightweight cryptography, algebraic cryptanalysis, public-key cryptography, elliptic curve cryptography
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.