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Mad Pain and Martian Pain
Abstract
Lewis invites us to consider two ostensible challenges to any materialist theory of the mind. The madman feels pain just as we do, but his pain differs greatly from ours in its characteristic causes and effects; the Martian also feels pain just as we do, but his pain differs greatly from ours in its physical realization. Lewis argues that his functionalist theory is adequate to meet the challenges presented by both cases. In the postscript, Lewis considers how advocates of phenomenal qualia respond to the functionalist account he defends; in particular, he responds to Frank Jackson's ‘knowledge argument’.
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Citations
Cited by
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A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief
Schwitzgebel, E. (2002) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/1468-0068.00370 · Cited by 517
Papineau, D. (2001) · Physicalism and its Discontents · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511570797.002 · Cited by 436
Harman, G. (1982) · Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic · doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1093883628 · Cited by 355
Real Acquaintance and Physicalism
Goff, P. (2015) · Phenomenal Qualities · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.003.0005 · Cited by 79
Metadata
- Authors
- Lewis, D.
- Venue
- Philosophical Papers Volume I
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 1983-08-18
- Pages
- 122-132
- OpenAlex
- W174525656
- Cited by
- 283
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 12.31
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Lewis, D. (1983). Mad Pain and Martian Pain. Philosophical Papers Volume I. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195032047.003.0009
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