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Cited by 355Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceSyntax, Semantics, Linguistic VariationEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Conceptual role semantics.

Open access
Harman, Gilbert·1982·Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
DOI 10.1305/ndjfl/1093883628
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Abstract

In this paper, I will attempt to say something about a number of issues that arise in connection with "conceptual role semantics," the approach to semantics for which I have the most sympathy.On this occasion I will be able only to sketch aspects of this view without being able to give detailed arguments. What is conceptual role semantics?A theory of conceptual role semantics involves the following two claims:1.The meanings of linguistic expressions are determined by the contents of the concepts and thoughts they can be used to express.2. The contents of concepts and thoughts are determined by their functional role in a person's psychology."Thoughts" here include beliefs, hopes, desires, fears, and other attitudes, in addition to thoughts properly so called."Functional role" includes any special roles a concept may play in perception and in inference or reasoning, including practical reasoning that leads to action.Conceptual role semantics represents one thing that might be meant by the slogan "meaning is use".But a proper appreciation of the point requires distinguishing (at least) two uses of symbols, their use in calculation, as in adding a column of figures, and their use in communication, as in telling someone the result. Two uses of symbols: communication and calculationSymbols that are being used in calculation are typically not being used at that time for communication.When you add a column of figures you are not normally communicating anything even to yourself.A similar point holds in reverse.

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36 of 36 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Under CRS, the meaning of a symbol is derived mostly or entirely from its relation to other symbols, i.e. its role in the thoughts and inferences in which it participates.

    “Under this account, the meaning of a symbol is derived (mostly or entirely) from its relation to other symbols, i.e. its role in the thoughts and inferences in which it participates.”

    From Symbols and grounding in large language models (2023) · cites this paper as [76]

    The Conclusion says that the ultimate source of meaning or content is the functional role symbols play in thought, supporting the claim's central point. But Section 3 explicitly says content does not depend only on relations among thoughts and concepts: relations to the external world through perception and action also matter. Section 2.1 adds that some concepts derive their content primarily from perception, so describing meaning as mostly or entirely a relation to other symbols overstates the account. (LLM, conf=0.89)

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  • The claim that the meaning of a symbol is defined by its role in communication is not universally endorsed.

    “However, the claim that the meaning of a symbol is defined by (i.e. as opposed to merely related to) its role in communication is not universally endorsed.”

    From Symbols and grounding in large language models (2023) · cites this paper as [76]

  • Under conceptual role semantics (CRS), the meaning of a symbol is a function of the contexts in which it occurs, where communication is just one part of this context.

    “Under CRS, the meaning of a symbol (word) is a function of the contexts in which it occurs, where communication is just one (possibly small) part of this context.”

    From Symbols and grounding in large language models (2023) · cites this paper as [76]

  • Under CRS, it is possible to argue that the role of a symbol in communication has a negligible effect on its meaning compared to the much more substantive effect of e.g. the role of the symbol in inference.

    “Within CRS, it is possible to argue, for example, that the role of a symbol in communication has a negligible effect on its meaning compared to the much more substantive effect of e.g. the role of the symbol in inference.”

    From Symbols and grounding in large language models (2023) · cites this paper as [76]

  • The competing view argues that symbols derive much, or even all, of their core meaning via their role in internal computations.

    “The competing view argues that symbols derive much, or even all, of their core meaning via their role in internal computations. [76] Summarizes this distinction:”

    From Symbols and grounding in large language models (2023) · cites this paper as [76]

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Cites

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4 of the 40 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Grice, H. P., "Meaning," Philosophical Review, vol. 68 (1959), pp. 377-388.
  2. Harman, G., "Logical form," Foundations of Language, vol. 9 (1972), pp. 38-65.
  3. Harman, G., "Meaning and semantics," in Semantics and Philosophy, eds., M. K. Munitz and P. Unger, New York University Press, New York, 1974.
  4. Harman, G., "Problems with probabilistic semantics," to appear in Developments in Semantics, eds., A. Orenstein et al., Haven Press, New York.

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Authors
Harman, G.
Corresponding author
Harman, Gilbert
Venue
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
Publisher
Duke University Press
Published
1982-04-01
Volume
23
Issue
2
Pages
242-256
ISSN
  • 0029-4527 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-0726
DOI
10.1305/ndjfl/1093883628
OpenAlex
W3125137382
Cited by
355
References
40
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 12 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 9
FWCI
2.32
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (publishedVersion)
  • Project Euclid (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Language and Linguistics › Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
conceptual role semantics, meaning as use, practical reasoning, perception

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