The DOI matches its Crossref record; 83 of the 83 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contemporary debates in epistemology
Abstract
Notes on Contributors. Preface. Part I: Knowledge and Skepticism. Introduction, Matthias Steup (St. Cloud State University). 1. Is Knowledge Closed under Known Entailment?. The Case against Closure, Fred Dretske (Stanford University and the University of Wisconsin). The Case for Closure, John Hawthorne (Rutgers University). Reply to Hawthorne, Fred Dretske (Stanford University and the University of Wisconsin). 2. Is Knowledge Contextual?. Contextualism Contested, Earl Conee (University of Rochester). Contextualism Defended, Stewart Cohen (Arizona State University). Contextualism Contested Some More, Earl Conee (University of Rochester)Contextualism Defended Some More, Stewart Cohen (Arizona State University). 3. Can Skepticism Be Refuted?. The Refutation of Skepticism, Jonathan Vogel (Amherst College). The Challenge of Refuting Skepticism, Richard Fumerton (University of Iowa). 4. Is There A Priori Knowledge?. In Defense of the a Priori, Laurence BonJour (University of Washington). There Is no a Priori, Michael Devitt (City University of New York). Reply to Devitt, Laurence BonJour (University of Washington). Reply to BonJour, Michael Devitt (City University of New York). Last Rejoinder, Laurence BonJour (University of Washington). References. Part II: Foundational Knowledge. Introduction, Matthias Steup (St. Cloud State University). 5. Is Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem?. Infinitism Is the Solution to the Regress Problem, Peter Klein (Rutgers University)Infinitism Is not the Solution to the Regress Problem, Carl Ginet (Cornell University). Reply to Ginet, Peter Klein (Rutgers University). Reply to Klein, Carl Ginet (Cornell University). 6. Can Beliefs Be Justified through Coherence Alone?. Non--foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability, Catherine Z. Elgin (Harvard Graduate School of Education). Why Coherence Is not Enough: In Defense of Moderate Foundationalism, James van Cleve (Brown University). 7. Is There Immediate Justification?. There Is Immediate Justification, James Pryor (Princeton University). Doing Without Immediate Justification, Michael Williams (Johns Hopkins University). 8. Does Perceptual Experience Have Conceptual Content?. Perceptual Experience Has Conceptual Content, Bill Brewer (Oxford University)Perception and Conceptual Content, Alex Byrne (Massachusetts Institute of Technology). Part III: Justification. Introduction, Matthias Steup (St. Cloud State University). 9. Is Justification Internal?. Justification Is not Internal, John Greco (Fordham University). Justification Is Internal, Richard Feldman (University of Rochester). 10. Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal?. Truth Is not the Primary Epistemic Goal, Jonathan Kvanvig (University of Missouri). Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis, Marian David (University of Notre Dame). 11. Is Justified Belief Responsible Belief?. Justified Belief as Responsible Belief, Richard Foley (New York University). Obligation, Entitlement, and Rationality, Nicholas Wolterstorff (Yale University)Response to Wolterstorff, Richard Foley (New York University). Response to Foley, Nicholas Wolterstorff (Yale University). Index
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Justification and the Truth-Connection
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Understanding, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge
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Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2005-09-01
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 01
- Pages
- 43-0232-43-0232
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W1546798033
- Cited by
- 969
- References
- 83
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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