Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 517

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief

Schwitzgebel, Eric·2002·Noûs

Abstract

This paper describes and defends in detail a novel account of belief, an account inspired by Ryle’s dispositional characterization of belief, but emphasizing irreducibly phenomenal and cognitive dispositions as well as behavioral dispositions. Potential externalist and functionalist objections are considered, as well as concerns motivated by the inevitably ceteris paribus nature of the relevant dispositional attributions. It is argued that a dispositional account of belief is particularly well‐suited to handle what might be called “in‐between” cases of believing—cases in which it is neither quite right to describe a person as having a particular belief nor quite right to describe her as lacking it.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/1468-0068.00370

Cites

35 of 35 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 35 references

Cited by

See all 517

Metadata

Authors
Schwitzgebel, E.
Venue
Noûs
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2002-06
Volume
36
Issue
2
Pages
249-275
ISSN
  • 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0068
OpenAlex
W1972868686
Cited by
517
References
35
FWCI
7.73
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1468-0068.00370
The paper
Schwitzgebel, E. (2002). A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief. Noûs. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0068.00370

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.