The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief
Abstract
This paper describes and defends in detail a novel account of belief, an account inspired by Ryle’s dispositional characterization of belief, but emphasizing irreducibly phenomenal and cognitive dispositions as well as behavioral dispositions. Potential externalist and functionalist objections are considered, as well as concerns motivated by the inevitably ceteris paribus nature of the relevant dispositional attributions. It is argued that a dispositional account of belief is particularly well‐suited to handle what might be called “in‐between” cases of believing—cases in which it is neither quite right to describe a person as having a particular belief nor quite right to describe her as lacking it.
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Citations
Cites
Ryle, G. (2006) · Theories of Mind · doi:10.5040/9798216413257.ch-2 · Cited by 6,809
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism
Millikan, R. G. (1984) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4124.001.0001 · Cited by 4,758
(1987) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 4,269
(2010) · Mind, Language and Reality · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625251.014 · Cited by 3,767
The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science
Cartwright, N. (1999) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139167093 · Cited by 2,433
Cartwright, N. (1983) · doi:10.1093/0198247044.001.0001 · Cited by 2,082
Logical Foundations of Probability
Savage, L. J., & Carnap, R. (1952) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907654 · Cited by 2,033
Dretske, F., Editions, C., & Recanati, F. (1995) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4872.001.0001 · Cited by 1,982
Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes
Churchland, P. M., & Journal of Philosophy Inc. (1981) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil198178268 · Cited by 1,814
Psychophysical and theoretical identifications
Lewis, D. (1972) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048407212341301 · Cited by 1,580
Cited by
SCHWITZGEBEL, E. (2010) · Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01381.x · Cited by 414
Self-citationSchwitzgebel, E. (2001) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00215 · Cited by 183
Self-citationCurry, D. S. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02641-z · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Schwitzgebel, E.
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2002-06
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 249-275
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0068
- OpenAlex
- W1972868686
- Cited by
- 517
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 7.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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