The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Recovering Understanding
Abstract
Proposes an analysis of the concept of understanding. Finds three important, relevant strands of thought in the works of Plato and Aristotle, among which the most important one is that understanding involves representing the world nonpropositionally, e.g. through visualization or diagrams. Taking this to be the defining characteristic, proposes that understanding is a state of comprehending nonpropositional structures of reality, such as automobiles, pieces of music or art, the character of a person, or a causal nexus. Argues that virtue epistemology is better suited than traditional epistemology to help us develop a successful analysis of understanding thus conceived. For unlike the theories from which it departs, virtue epistemology takes the objects of valuable epistemic states to consist of both propositional and nonpropositional objects.
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Citations
Cites
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
Hiley, D. R., & Philosophy Documentation Center (1980) · International Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.5840/ipq198020335 · Cited by 3,235
Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge
Zagzebski, L. T. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174763 · Cited by 2,211
Self-citationPlantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
WHAT THE TORTOISE SAID TO ACHILLES
CARROLL, L. (1895) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/iv.14.278 · Cited by 1,417
Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology
Sosa, E. (1991) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625299 · Cited by 1,002
Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078624.001.0001 · Cited by 995
Goldman, A. I. (1967) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024268 · Cited by 925
Philosophical Perspectives 5: Philosophy of Religion
Leftow, B., & The Society of Christian Philosophers (1996) · Faith and Philosophy · doi:10.5840/faithphil19961323 · Cited by 763
Fraassen, B. C. V. (1991) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0198239807.001.0001 · Cited by 464
MOSER, P. K. (1988) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1988.tb02052.x · Cited by 338
Cited by
Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology
Hills, A. (2009) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/648610 · Cited by 648
The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good
Zagzebski, L. (2003) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/1467-9973.00257 · Cited by 288
Self-citationEPISTEMIC AUTHORITY, PREEMPTIVE REASONS, AND UNDERSTANDING
Jäger, C. (2016) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2015.38 · Cited by 144
Watson, L. (2016) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12316 · Cited by 39
ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding
Malfatti, F. I. (2025) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2025.2449599 · Cited by 21
Metadata
- Authors
- Zagzebski, L.
- Venue
- Knowledge, Truth, and Duty
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2001-03-22
- Pages
- 235-252
- OpenAlex
- W4251157799
- Cited by
- 268
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 6.83
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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