The DOI matches its Crossref record; 74 of the 74 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Indispensability of Mathematics
Abstract
Looks at the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument in the philosophy of mathematics. This argument urges us to place mathematical entities on the same ontological footing as other theoretical entities indispensable to our best scientific theories. The indispensability argument has come under serious scrutiny in recent times, with many influential philosophers unconvinced of its cogency. This book outlines the indispensability argument in considerable detail, before defending it against various challenges. Although the focus is squarely on the indispensability argument, in order to appreciate the argument's full force, it is necessary to consider many other interesting and related topics. These include questions about ontological commitments and the applications of mathematics to physical theories. Of particular interest here is the Quinean backdrop from which the indispensability argument emerges. This backdrop consists of the doctrines of holism and naturalism. The latter is crucial to the whole indispensability debate, so a considerable portion of this work is spent discussing naturalism.
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Citations
Cites
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science
Hacking, I. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814563 · Cited by 4,814
Fraassen, B. C. V. (1980) · doi:10.1093/0198244274.001.0001 · Cited by 4,682
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
Quine, W. V. (1969) · doi:10.7312/quin92204 · Cited by 3,593
Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery
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Elementary Differential Equations and Boundary Value Problems.
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Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science.
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Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy
Russell, B., & Potter, M. (2022) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003308881 · Cited by 1,918
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Cited by
The logical structure of the world
Maddy, P. (2007) · Second Philosophy · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.003.0018 · Cited by 665
Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method
Maddy, P. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.001.0001 · Cited by 320
A Counterfactual Approach to Explanation in Mathematics
Baron, S., Colyvan, M., & Ripley, D. (2020) · Philosophia Mathematica · doi:10.1093/philmat/nkz023 · Cited by 48
Self-citationTersman, F., & Risberg, O. (2022) · Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · doi:10.1007/s10677-022-10275-y · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Colyvan, M.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2001-04-19
- OpenAlex
- W4289805266
- Cited by
- 520
- References
- 74
- FWCI
- 3.24
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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