The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public
Abstract
Explores issues ranging from introspection to social epistemology. “Internalism Exposed” pinpoints problems in the defense of internalism as an approach to epistemic justification. “A Priori Warrant and Naturalistic Epistemology” argues that naturalistic epistemology is compatible with a priori warrant, and shows how scientific research supports an innate faculty of number cognition that can generate arithmetic belief with a priori warrant. “The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues” examines the prospects for a unifying account of distinct epistemic values, such as justified belief and true belief. The next three papers consider intuitions and introspection from an epistemological perspective. One paper explains how intuitions can play the evidential role that philosophical practice assigns to it. Two papers argue that introspection plays an unavoidable but legitimate role in the science of consciousness despite being a “private” method. The final three papers deal with aspects of social epistemology. One asks how novices can justifiably choose among two or more competing experts. Another explores the possibility of an epidemiology of knowledge, of which memetics is a prominent example. The final paper provides a critical survey and guide to the diverse approaches to social epistemology.
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Cites
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(1982) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477 · Cited by 8,240
Psychology as the behaviorist views it
Watson, J. B. (1913) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0074428 · Cited by 3,230
Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry
Longino, H. E. (1990) · doi:10.1515/9780691209753 · Cited by 3,092
Context theory of classification learning
Medin, D. L., & Schaffer, M. M. (1978) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.85.3.207 · Cited by 3,061
Blind variation and selective retentions in creative thought as in other knowledge processes
Campbell, D. T. (1960) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0040373 · Cited by 2,329
Tomasello, M., Kruger, A. C., & Ratner, H. H. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0003123x · Cited by 1,891
Fraassen, B. C. V. (1989) · doi:10.1093/0198248601.001.0001 · Cited by 1,821
Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
Cheng, P. W., & Holyoak, K. J. (1985) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(85)90014-3 · Cited by 1,463
Further analysis of the hippocampal amnesic syndrome: 14-year follow-up study of H.M.
Milner, B., Corkin, S., & Teuber, H.-L. (1968) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/0028-3932(68)90021-3 · Cited by 1,229
Cited by
Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
Goldman, A. I. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195138929.001.0001 · Cited by 1,470
Self-citationEvaluating knowledge of the nature of (whole) science
Allchin, D. (2011) · Science Education · doi:10.1002/sce.20432 · Cited by 618
Expanding the Dimensions of Epistemic Cognition: Arguments From Philosophy and Psychology
CHINN, C. A., BUCKLAND, L. A., & SAMARAPUNGAVAN, A. (2011) · Educational Psychologist · doi:10.1080/00461520.2011.587722 · Cited by 524
Reconceptualizing nature‐of‐science education in the age of social media
Höttecke, D., & Allchin, D. (2020) · Science Education · doi:10.1002/sce.21575 · Cited by 303
Diversity and language technology: how language modeling bias causes epistemic injustice
Helm, P., Bella, G., Koch, G., & Giunchiglia, F. (2024) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-023-09742-6 · Cited by 110
Metadata
- Authors
- Goldman, A. I.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2002-01-31
- OpenAlex
- W2504995794
- Cited by
- 171
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 7.54
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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