In Defense of Sentimentality
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Philosophy has as much to do with feelings as it does with thoughts and thinking. It requires sensitivity and a kind of devotion as well as curiosity about the world and a critical spirit. It is a fascination not only with abstract ideas and logically possible worlds but with concrete and very real human concerns and engagements, “the human condition” To be a philosopher is to be steadfastly attentive to what it means to be human, to the passions as well as to much-celebrated “rationality” It is to be concerned with what it means to “exist,” to the satisfactions and worries and real life joys and confusions that affect us all. That is why one of the canonical exhortations in philosophy, inherited from the Delphic Oracle via Socrates, has always been “know thyself,” for it is through unusually rigorous self-examination that we come to know not only ourselves but our Selves, our deepest feelings, fears, and hopes. Philosophy, accordingly, in its concern for feelings, requires not only emotional sensitivity but an understanding of the emotions, not as curious but marginal psychological phenomena but as the very substance of life. And yet, philosophy and philosophers have much more often than not shunned the emotions and defined their profession and themselves strictly in terms of reason and rationality. In the history of philosophy sensitivity is often dismissed as mere “sentimentality.” Sentiment and sentimentality are to be avoided. In this book I am concerned to defend sentimentality and the emotions–at least, some emotions–as essential to life. Foremost among the essential emotions are the sentiments of love and compassion. Not all of the sentiments are so kindly, however. Accordingly, I discuss not only such “moral sentiments” as sympathy and compassion but also grief, gratitude, love, horror, and even vengeance. All of these have suffered from considerable abuse, though from different quarters, but all of them play a central if not essential role in our experience and our lives.
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Citations
Cites
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An argument for basic emotions
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Cited by
Grief and the Unity of Emotion
Ratcliffe, M. (2017) · Midwest Studies In Philosophy · doi:10.1111/misp.12071 · Cited by 63
Ethics, knowledge, and a procedural approach to wellbeing
Klausen, S. H. (2023) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2018.1529619 · Cited by 18
Osborne, C. (2007) · Dumb Beasts and Dead Philosophers · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282067.003.0003
Metadata
- Authors
- Solomon, R. C.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2004-09-09
- OpenAlex
- W1984510809
- Cited by
- 218
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 14.80
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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