The DOI matches its Crossref record; 119 of the 119 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Abstract
Libertarian accounts of free will face objections that the indeterminism they require would leave behavior random, inexplicable, and beyond agents’ control. This book examines three main types of libertarian views—noncausal, event-causal, and agent-causal—to see how well they can meet such challenges. Noncausal accounts are found not to offer satisfactory views of action and reason-explanation. Event-causal and agent-causal accounts are defended against a number of objections. But if both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism, then there is no adequate account of free will.
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Cites
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Frankfurt, H. G. (1971) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024717 · Cited by 4,663
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
Searle, J. R. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173452 · Cited by 4,575
The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory
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Strawson, P. F. (1962) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 3,223
Davidson, D. (1963) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2023177 · Cited by 2,938
The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays
Frankfurt, H. G. (1988) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818172 · Cited by 2,634
Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World
Salmon, W. C. (1985) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691221489 · Cited by 2,459
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
Frankfurt, H. G. (1969) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2023833 · Cited by 2,405
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.
Velleman, J. D., & Bratman, M. E. (1991) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185304 · Cited by 2,384
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814594 · Cited by 2,249
Cited by
Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility
Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2005) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080500264180 · Cited by 526
Mele, A. R. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195305043.001.0001 · Cited by 493
From Modal Collapse to Providential Collapse
Schmid, J. C. (2022) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-021-00438-z · Cited by 10
Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck
Franklin, C. E. (2015) · Criminal Law and Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s11572-013-9274-1 · Cited by 7
Luck and Agent-Causation: A Response to Franklin
Levy, N. (2015) · Criminal Law and Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s11572-014-9306-5 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Clarke, R.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2003-10-30
- OpenAlex
- W1517920372
- Cited by
- 474
- References
- 119
- FWCI
- 5.93
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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