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Cited by 253

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 146 of the 146 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment

Bishop, Michael A, Trout, J. D. · 2005

Abstract

This book presents a new approach to epistemology (the theory of human knowledge and reasoning). Its approach aims to liberate epistemology from the scholastic debates of standard analytic epistemology, and treat it as a branch of the philosophy of science. The approach is novel in its use of cost-benefit analysis to guide people facing real reasoning problems and in its framework for resolving normative disputes in psychology. Based on empirical data, the book shows how people can improve their reasoning by relying on Statistical Prediction Rules (SPRs). It then develops and articulates the positive core of the book. The view presented — Strategic Reliabilism — claims that epistemic excellence consists in the efficient allocation of cognitive resources to reliable reasoning strategies, applied to significant problems. The last third of the book develops the implications of this view for standard analytic epistemology; for resolving normative disputes in psychology; and for offering practical, concrete advice on how this theory can improve real people's reasoning.

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Crossref · 10.1093/0195162293.001.0001

Cites

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Metadata

Authors
Bishop, M. A., & Trout, J. D.
Published
2005-01-13
OpenAlex
W327258225
Cited by
253
References
146
FWCI
27.68
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/0195162293.001.0001
The paper
Bishop, M. A., & Trout, J. D. (2005). Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195162293.001.0001

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.