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Cited by 81Free Will and AgencyPhilosophical Ethics and TheoryPsychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility

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Björnsson, Gunnar, Persson, Karl·2012·Noûs
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00813.x
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Abstract

In this paper, we do three things. First, we put forth a novel hypothesis about judgments of moral responsibility according to which such judgments are a species of explanatory judgments. Second, we argue that this hypothesis explains both some general features of everyday thinking about responsibility and the appeal of skeptical arguments against moral responsibility. Finally, we argue that, if correct, the hypothesis provides a defense against these skeptical arguments.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00813.x

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57 of 57 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Responsibility for an outcome requires a reliable causal connection between the agent's intention to reach or avoid the outcome and the outcome in fact being reached or avoided.

    “This is because responsibility for an outcome requires a reliable causal connection between the agent's intention to reach or avoid the outcome and the outcome in fact being reached or avoided”

    From AI, Opacity, and Personal Autonomy (2022) · cites this paper as Björnsson and Persson, 2012

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Authors
Björnsson, G., & Persson, K.
Affiliations
  • Linköping University (SE)
  • University of Gothenburg (SE)
ORCID
Björnsson, Gunnar
Venue
Noûs
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2011-01-20
Volume
46
Issue
2
Pages
326-354
ISSN
  • 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0068
DOI
10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00813.x
OpenAlex
W2097080168
Cited by
81
References
57
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 4 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 6 · 2012: 3
FWCI
1.68
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor)
Locations
  • Noûs (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Keywords
moral responsibility, explanation, free will

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