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Cited by 29Free Will and AgencyPhilosophical Ethics and TheoryPhilosophy and Theoretical Science

Agency, Teleological Control and Robust Causation

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Usher, Marius·2020·Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12537
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Abstract

I propose a compatibilist theory of agency and responsibility, according to which an agent is responsible for an effect, if and only if, she is the earliest source of robust causation over it, via an action she carried out in the service of her long term interests. This theory deploys a notion of teleological control, which is a type of guidance‐control of the agent over the effect and it involves action plans and means‐end reasoning. The theory makes room for degrees of responsibility, and accounts for the distinction between compulsion and determination. The teleological control view is informed by neuroscience and cognitive theory, and while it is indifferent to the distinction between determinism and indeterminism, it contends that the property of natural laws relevant to agency is the presence of successive stages of attractor and bifurcation dynamics. While the former grounds robust causation over effects of actions, the latter limits the temporal range of robustness, allowing us to characterize responsibility in terms of the earliest sources of robust causation.

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  • Responsibility for an outcome requires a reliable causal connection between the agent's intention to reach or avoid the outcome and the outcome in fact being reached or avoided.

    “This is because responsibility for an outcome requires a reliable causal connection between the agent's intention to reach or avoid the outcome and the outcome in fact being reached or avoided”

    From AI, Opacity, and Personal Autonomy (2022) · cites this paper as Usher, 2020

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Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Balaguer, Mark. (2014) Free Will. The MIT Press.
  2. Beebee, Helen. (2013) Free Will. Palgrave Macmillan.
  3. Moore, G. E. (1912) Ethics. Ed. W. H. Shaw. Oxford, OUP, 2005.
  4. Nagel, Thomas. (1979) 'Moral luck'. In Mortal Questions. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 24-38.
  5. Stump, Elenore. (2002) 'Control and causal determinism', in S. Buss and L. Overton Eds., Contours of Agency, Cambridge, MIT.

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Authors
Usher, M.
Affiliations
Tel Aviv University (IL)
Corresponding author
Usher, Marius
ORCID
Usher, Marius
Venue
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2018-08-18
Volume
100
Issue
2
Pages
302-324
ISSN
  • 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
  • 1933-1592
DOI
10.1111/phpr.12537
OpenAlex
W2887050088
Cited by
29
References
72
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 2 · 2018: 1
FWCI
1.94
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor)
Locations
  • Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Funders
United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation (2014612)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
agency, moral responsibility, compatibilism, means-ends reasoning, action plan, compulsive behavior, determination, attractor dynamics, bifurcation dynamics, natural law, determinism and indeterminism

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