The DOI matches its Crossref record; 86 of the 86 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind
Abstract
Many themes in the papers collected here are negative: there is no a priori knowledge or analytic truth; logic is not a theory of reasoning; a theory of truth conditions is not a theory of meaning; a purely objective account of meaning or mind cannot say what words mean or what it is like to see things in colour. Other themes are positive: theoretical reasoning has important practical aspects; meaning depends on how words are used to think with i.e. on how concepts function in reasoning, perception and action; the relevant uses or functions relate concepts to aspects of the environment and other things in the world; translation plays a central role in any adequate account of mind or meaning.
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Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Fraassen, B. C. V. (1980) · doi:10.1093/0198244274.001.0001 · Cited by 4,682
Plans and the structure of behavior.
Miller, G. A., Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. H. (1960) · doi:10.1037/10039-000 · Cited by 4,630
Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science
Feigl, H., & Scriven, M. S. (1956) · Cited by 4,420
Madden, E. H., Goodman, N., & Melsen, A. G. V. (1955) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2103789 · Cited by 4,377
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
N., E., von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1945) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2019327 · Cited by 4,006
Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers
(1975) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625251 · Cited by 3,918
(1967) · Cited by 3,831
Language identification in the limit
Gold, E. M. (1967) · Information and Control · doi:10.1016/s0019-9958(67)91165-5 · Cited by 3,572
McClelland, J. L., Rumelhart, D. E., & AU (1987) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5237.001.0001 · Cited by 3,315
Cited by
The role of causal criteria in causal inferences: Bradford Hill's "aspects of association"
Ward, A. C. (2009) · Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations · doi:10.1186/1742-5573-6-2 · Cited by 120
“As noted by Harman, it is "an interesting and nontrivial problem to say just how deductions are relevant to reasoning," but it is an interesting and nontrivial problem just because deductive relationships are not instances of reasoning [92].”
Common Sense as Evidence: Against Revisionary Ontology and Skepticism
KELLY, T. (2008) · Midwest Studies In Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2008.00165.x · Cited by 105
Metadata
- Authors
- Harman, G.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 1999-07-01
- OpenAlex
- W3143221605
- Cited by
- 409
- References
- 86
- FWCI
- 15.06
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/0198238029.001.0001
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- Harman, G. (1999). Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198238029.001.0001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
