The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Meaning
Abstract
The aim of this work is to demystify linguistic meaning—to characterize the underlying nature of this phenomenon in such a way that its familiar attributes become intelligible. To that end, one must consider whether a word's meaning derives from what it refers to, from the way it was defined, from some associated mental image, from its evolutionary function, from a prototype structure, from an inferential role, or from something else. The basic strategy adopted here for answering this question is to scrutinize a range of general features of meaning that have often been thought to provide clues to its origin—facts concerning the relationships between meaning and understanding, truth, a priori knowledge, complex expressions, what ought to be said, and actual word usage. It is a striking result, however, that only the last of these characteristics proves to be capable of guiding us towards a theory of how meaning arises: namely, that all our particular applications of a given word result, in part, from what we mean by it. This characteristic is explained—and can only be explained—by the theory presented here, whereby meaning properties are reduced to law‐like regularities of word use. More specifically, the theory is that each word means what it does in virtue of the fact that a certain ‘acceptance property’ of the word is explanatorily fundamental vis‐à‐vis its overall deployment (where an ’acceptance property’ specifies conditions in which designated sentences containing the word are held true). This proposal is forced to confront a formidable barrage of objections; but in each case an adequate reply is shown to be available.
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Citations
Cites
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism
Millikan, R. G. (1984) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4124.001.0001 · Cited by 4,758
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
Davidson, D. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199246297.001.0001 · Cited by 4,215
Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers
(1975) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625251 · Cited by 3,918
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
Quine, W. V. (1969) · doi:10.7312/quin92204 · Cited by 3,593
Philosophical Investigations: Philosophische Untersuchungen
Burnheim, J., & Philosophical Studies, W. S. F. T. N. U. O. I. (1954) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.5840/philstudies1954421 · Cited by 2,902
Grice, H. P. (1957) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2182440 · Cited by 2,824
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind
Fodor, J. A. (1987) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5684.001.0001 · Cited by 2,756
Reference and Definite Descriptions
Donnellan, K. S. (1966) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183143 · Cited by 2,505
The Architecture of the Language Faculty
Aitchison, J., & Jackendoff, R. (1998) · Language · doi:10.2307/417010 · Cited by 1,991
Psychophysical and theoretical identifications
Lewis, D. (1972) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048407212341301 · Cited by 1,580
Cited by
Dancy, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0199270023.001.0001 · Cited by 1,677
Wedgwood, R. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.001.0001 · Cited by 683
Horwich, P. (1998) · doi:10.1093/0198752237.001.0001 · Cited by 608
Self-citationSchiffer, S. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199257760.001.0001 · Cited by 574
Priest, G. (2002) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199254057.001.0001 · Cited by 428
Metadata
- Authors
- Horwich, P.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 1998-12-03
- OpenAlex
- W4240443112
- Cited by
- 635
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 52.44
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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