The DOI matches its Crossref record; 103 of the 103 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Nature of Normativity
Abstract
This book presents a complete theory about the nature of normative thought, that is, the sort of thought that is concerned with what ought to be the case, or what we ought to do or think. This theory implies a kind of metanormative realism, according to which normative truths or facts are genuinely part of reality. At the same time, the theory aims to provide a substantive account of the nature of these normative facts, and a substantive explanation of how it is possible for us to know these facts and to refer to them in language or thought. In providing these explanations, the theory relies on a version of the idea (which has been much discussed in recent work in the philosophy of mind) of the normativity of the intentional. This is the idea that there is no way to explain the nature of the various sorts of mental states that have intentionality or representational content (such as beliefs, judgments, desires, decisions, and so on) without stating normative facts. This idea provides the basis for a systematic theory that deals with the following three areas: the semantics of normative statements (which investigates the meaning of statements about what ought to be); the metaphysics of normative facts (about the nature of the facts stated by these statements); and the epistemology of normative belief (about what justifies us in holding beliefs that these statements express).
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition
Rawls, J. (1971) · doi:10.4159/9780674042605 · Cited by 9,496
An Essay concerning Human Understanding
Locke, J. (1690) · The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding · doi:10.1093/oseo/instance.00018020 · Cited by 5,192
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
Searle, J. R. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173452 · Cited by 4,575
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
Davidson, D. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199246297.001.0001 · Cited by 4,215
Korsgaard, C. M., & O'Neill, O. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511554476 · Cited by 4,013
Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers
(1975) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625251 · Cited by 3,918
New work for a theory of universals
Lewis, D. (1983) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048408312341131 · Cited by 3,140
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind
Fodor, J. A. (1987) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5684.001.0001 · Cited by 2,756
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment
Gibbard, A. (1990) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198249856.001.0001 · Cited by 2,619
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
Brink, D. O. (1989) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511624612 · Cited by 1,926
Cited by
Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence
Kelly, T. (2010) · Disagreement · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0007 · Cited by 544
The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
Cuneo, T., & Shafer-Landau, R. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0277-5 · Cited by 270
De Cruz, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108557849 · Cited by 24
Laitinen, A., Niemelä, M., Pirhonen, J., & Philosophy Documentation Center (2019) · Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology · doi:10.5840/techne20191127108 · Cited by 19
ON THE SUPPOSED DILEMMA OF CONCILIATIONISM
Reining, S. (2016) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2015.47 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Wedgwood, R.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2007-07-19
- OpenAlex
- W1516320229
- Cited by
- 683
- References
- 103
- FWCI
- 35.90
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Nature of Normativity. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.001.0001
- The paper
- Wedgwood, R. (2007). The Nature of Normativity. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780199251315.001.0001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.