The DOI matches its Crossref record; 76 of the 76 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
Abstract
Applies the results of Ch. 7 to scientific methodology and shows that they give a logical interpretation of the subjective Bayesian theory of inductive inference. This theory is therefore no more necessarily subjective than deductive logic, consisting as both do of objective logical rules for proceeding from premises to conclusion. In the Bayesian case, the premises are prior probability assignments. It is shown that familiar rules of scientific method are endorsed, and, in particular, the rule that unless there is prior support for a hypothesis, its overall probability will be very small however good the fit with current evidence.
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Cites
A Mathematical Theory of Communication
Shannon, C. E. (1948) · Bell System Technical Journal · doi:10.1002/j.1538-7305.1948.tb00917.x · Cited by 48,949
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50th Anniversary Edition
Kuhn, T. S., & Hacking, I. (2012) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226458144.001.0001 · Cited by 21,170
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Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts
Latour, B. (1986) · DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) · Cited by 7,491
Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(72)90016-3 · Cited by 4,851
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Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities
Walley, P. (1991) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4899-3472-7 · Cited by 2,655
Logical Foundations of Probability.
Burks, A. W., & Carnap, R. (1951) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2021419 · Cited by 2,370
Cited by
Theorizing Borders: An Interdisciplinary Perspective
Brunet-Jailly, E. (2005) · Geopolitics · doi:10.1080/14650040500318449 · Cited by 406
You Can Generalize Stupid! Social Scientists, Bent Flyvbjerg, and Case Study Methodology
Ruddin, L. P. (2006) · Qualitative Inquiry · doi:10.1177/1077800406288622 · Cited by 274
Across the Boundaries: Extrapolation in Biology and Social Science
Steel, D. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331448.001.0001 · Cited by 109
Desmedt, O., Luminet, O., Maurage, P., & Corneille, O. (2025) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916231191537 · Cited by 80
Metadata
- Authors
- Howson, C.
- Venue
- Hume's Problem
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2000-11-02
- Pages
- 168-220
- OpenAlex
- W2477771201
- Cited by
- 277
- References
- 76
- FWCI
- 61.98
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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