The DOI matches its Crossref record; 276 of the 276 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Political Economy of Social Pacts: ‘Competitive Corporatism’ and European Welfare Reform
Abstract
This is the third of three chapters on the role of economic interests, and of systems for representing those interests, in the politics of welfare state reform; they explore the linkages between national welfare states and national economies, and examine the processes through which economic actors press their interests on policy makers. Here Rhodes explores the implications for welfare states of nationally negotiated social pacts in bridging and making innovative linkages between social security systems and employment rules and wage bargaining. The essential argument of Sect. 1 is that the emergence of social pacts is linked to common domestic and external pressures for welfare state reform in the European Union, and that contrary to the expectations of many commentators, these pressures are neither ‘disorganizing’ European capitalism nor neutralizing the power of the state; furthermore, rather than fragmenting political‐economic structures, pressures for reform have in many instances modified or even bolstered efforts at coordination via bargaining. Section 2 introduces the notion of ‘competitive corporatism’, and shows that underpinning these social pacts are varying degrees of associational cohesion, and two types of coalition — seeking distributional deals and productivity gains — which have complex linkages and overlaps. In ideal typical terms, it can be suggested that competitive corporatism is successfully achieved if underpinned by a close but flexible interlocking of these two types of coalition, although in practice it is not always possible, as has been demonstrated in various continental European countries.
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Cited by
West European Politics in the Age of Globalization
Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2008) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511790720 · Cited by 2,319
Culture and Welfare State Policies: Reflections on a Complex Interrelation
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Reforming Early Retirement in Europe, Japan and the USA
Ebbinghaus, B. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0199286116.001.0001 · Cited by 477
The Middle-Income Trap: More Politics than Economics
Doner, R. F., & Schneider, B. R. (2016) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887116000095 · Cited by 286
Metadata
- Authors
- Rhodes, M.
- Venue
- The New Politics of the Welfare State
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2001-04-05
- Pages
- 165-194
- OpenAlex
- W1520662041
- Cited by
- 394
- References
- 276
- FWCI
- 288.86
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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