The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies
Abstract
Parliamentary democracy is the most common way of organizing delegation and accountability in contemporary democracies. Yet knowledge of this type of regime has been incomplete and often unsystematic. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies offers new conceptual clarity on the topic. Taking principal-agent theory as its framework, the work illustrates how a variety of apparently unrelated representation issues can now be understood. This procedure allows scholarship to move well beyond what have previously been cloudy and confusing debates aimed at defining the virtues and p ... More
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Cited by
No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing the Politicization of European Integration
De Wilde, P. (2011) · Journal of European Integration · doi:10.1080/07036337.2010.546849 · Cited by 507
John, P. (2003) · Policy Studies Journal · doi:10.1111/1541-0072.00039 · Cited by 393
The Limits to Public Value, or Rescuing Responsible Government from the Platonic Guardians
Rhodes, R. A. W., & Wanna, J. (2007) · Australian Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8500.2007.00553.x · Cited by 385
Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions
Filippov, M., Ordeshook, P. C., & Shvetsova, O. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610875 · Cited by 366
De facto independence after delegation: A fuzzy‐set analysis
Maggetti, M. (2007) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/j.1748-5991.2007.00023.x · Cited by 275
Metadata
- Authors
- Strøm, K., Müller, W. C., & Bergman, T.
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2003-11-20
- OpenAlex
- W4298058804
- Cited by
- 556
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 39.67
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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